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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article develops a model regulatory scheme for public
employee retirement systems by examining the relation be-
tween the legal theory, structure, and mechanics of such sys-
tems and the performance of those who regulate and manage
them. The Article focuses on the regulation of public pension
fund investment, rather than on benefit and funding policy.
Pension plan benefits are funded by employer contributions'
and the income generated through their investment. Contribu-
tions must increase or benefits decrease, or both, if fund invest-
ments fail to produce the return needed to make the promised
payments. Thus, proper management of fund assets is essen-
tial if the promised benefits are to be provided within the es-
tablished contribution rates. This is especially true in public
pension systems where political and legal constraints are likely
to impair the ability of management to reduce employee bene-
fits or to increase government contributions through higher tax
rates. Another reason to focus on the control of plan funds is
the increasing attention public plan assets are receiving as a
potential source of money to finance social welfare projects.2
Part II of this Article explores the proper objective(s) of
public pension fund regulation. Part HI examines the regula-
tory legal framework of two state pension systems3 and identi-
1. Public pension plans also may be funded in part by employee
contributions.
2. See infra note 12. A recent study issued by the Urban Institute reports
that state and local pension plan assets equal almost two hundred billion dol-
lars and are increasing by more than twenty billion dollars each year. [1981]
338 PENS. REP. (BNA) A-10. Social investing proponents have succeeded in in-
troducing measures in Congress permitting the use of pension funds to finance
social welfare improvements. See, e.g., H.R. 6525, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REC. H914 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1980).
3. The Article uses Minnesota as a primary case study of the regulation
and operation of public pension funds and the Ohio School Employees Retire-
ment System as a second case study to compare and contrast with Minnesota.
Minnesota is an especially appropriate state to use as a case study of public
employee retirement system regulation for several reasons. Over the years,
Minnesota has evolved an institutional structure aimed at reducing the local
political pressures inherent in many of the local public employee plans by con-
solidating the investment of many of its state and local public employee retire-
ment funds in a constitutionally created State Board of Investment. See MNN.
STAT. § 11A.23 (1980). The Minnesota structure, as it has evolved, is geared to
vesting investment power and activities in the hands of financial and invest-
ment experts who are politically accountable. See MINN. STAT. § 11A.03 (1980)
(State Board of Investment consisting of five constitutional officers); MINN.
STAT. § 11A.07 (1980) (experienced investment professional as executive direc-
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fies major inefficiencies in fund regulation. Part IV draws on
the conclusions in parts II and I to suggest a model frame-
work for the regulation of public pension fund management
aimed at effectuating portfolio selection efficiency.
H. THE PROPER CONTROL OBJECTIVE OF PENSION
FUND INVESTMENT
A. PURPOSE AND NATURE OF PUBLIc EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS
A determination of the proper objective(s) of public pen-
sion plan investment regulation logically begins with an analy-
sis of the purpose and nature of public pension retirement
systems. The primary reason for the establishment of pension
plans, whether public or private, is to provide employees with a
source of income during retirement. Retirement income in the
United States comes from three principal sources: federal so-
cial security old-age payments, personal savings, and employer
retirement programs. 4 Employer pension plans developed as
tor); MINN. STAT. § IlA.08 (1980) (Investment Advisory Council comprised of in-
dividuals experienced in general investment matters). Recent statutory
changes have placed Minnesota among those states which are broadening the
investment horizons of their pension plans in an attempt to take advantage of
the increased return available through nontraditional investment vehicles and
asset mixes. See MiNN. STAT. § 11A.24(6) (Supp. 1981). Furthermore, legislation
proposed in Minnesota, S.F. 452, 72d Sess. (1981), squarely raises the "social in-
vesting" issue which is currently being debated by politicians, fund administra-
tors, unions, scholars and various interest groups in an increasing number of
states. See infra note 12. Finally, recent events have placed Minnesota on the
brink of a transitional period which may encompass fundamental changes in
the philosophy and control of the system's policy formulation, management,
and performance review. See infra note 107. The problems facing the Minne-
sota system, the issues which are currently being debated, the proposed solu-
tions, and the responses of those involved with the plans seem certain to have
implications for public employee pension systems throughout the United
States.
4. In a statement before the President's Commission on Pension Policy,
D. Grubb commented.
Every American should retire with an adequate retirement income.
Many of us were nurtured on the idea that such an income rests on a
three-legged stool of social security, employer retirement programs and
individual savings....
Prjections by the Social Security Administration indicate that the
median worker retiring at age 65 will receive a primary insurance
amount equal to 41% of his preretirement income. While this is of sub-
stantial assistance, by itself it does not provide an adequate retirement
income. This is why most of us are advocates of an employer retire-
ment program to supplement social security...
D. Grubb, Statement before President's Commission on Pension Policy (June
22, 1979), reprinted in [1979] 246 PENS. REP. (BNA) R-28. See also Summary of
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an integral component of the nation's retirement system to fill
the gap between the level of income needed for employees to
maintain an adequate standard of living during retirement and
the level of income provided by social security and personal
savings.5
To the extent that employees forego higher wage levels or
make mandatory contributions to a retirement plan fund in ex-
change for income during their retirement years, employer re-
tirement programs serve as a means of deferring compensation.
Particularly in the public sector, employees have historically
been paid less in wages but more in retirement benefits.6 The
growth of collective bargaining for pension rights has increased
the use of retirement benefits as a form of deferred
compensation.7
Most public retirement systems provide for the timely pay-
ment of pension benefits by accumulating and investing a fund
of assets in advance of employee retirements. 8 There are two
principal reasons for the use of advance funding of public pen-
Report of 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security, [1979] 270 PENS. REP.
(BNA) R-1. The summary stated:
The social security programs are but one part of a complex set of
public and private approaches to income maintenance. Support is
available from four basic sources when earnings stop: social security
based on past earnings; savings, insurance, annuities, and other volun-
tary personal arrangements; private pensions; and public programs
based on current need. The council believes that the social security
program must always be viewed in the context of these other impor-
tant elements of the income maintenance system.
Id. at R-6.
5. More than two million people receive retirement benefits from public
pension plans and another nine million workers are covered by such plans.
[1981] 338 PENS. REP. (BNA) A-1.
6. The author of a major study of public employee retirement systems
points out that "[p]rivate wage-and-salary levels outstripped the public levels
during World War II and its aftermath..." 1P. TmovE, PuBLIc EMPLOYEE PEN-
SION FUNDS 79-80 (1976). Public employees have argued that underpayment
during employment justifies pensions higher than those of private sector em-
ployees. Id. at 4-5. The survey concluded that public retirement plans provide
an average benefit level higher and more generous than private plans. Id. at 49,
67. It should be noted, however, that public employee salaries have been com-
petitive with private industry since 1967. Id. at 80.
7. Although public pensions are not in fact collectively bargained in many
states, "[rietirement benefits are obviously part of remuneration and of the
conditions of employment and unless specifically excluded, they may become
the subject of bargaining" in those states which "have recognized the right of
public employees to collective bargaining." Id. at 251, 353. See also T.
BLEAKNEY, RETIREMENT SYSTEMS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 160-61 (1972).
8. HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 95m CONG. 2D SESS., PENSION
TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYsTEMS 145 (Comm.
Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT].
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sion plans.9 First, advance funding helps insure the availability
of a source of money to meet pension claims as they become
due. Second, the investment income earned on fund assets
reduces the ultimate cost to taxpayers who must finance pen-
sion claims. As the author of a major study of public pension
funds explains:
A pension fund represents one of the few means by which a state or
local government can realize investment yield, which is a painless
source of income to meet pension disbursements. That income Will
serve to reduce the upward pressure on future tax rates. Moreover, the
investment yield of a public pension fund is held in trust for the pen-
sion plan; it therefore offsets costs, not for government in general, but
specifically with respect to the pension plan. Holding that particular
cost in check helps to assure continuation of the commitment.1 0
The objective of public pension fund regulation, therefore,
should be the accumulation of a fund sufficient to provide pub-
lic employees the promised benefits at the least cost to taxpay-
ers. To accomplish this objective, the regulatory legal
framework must seek, within an appropriate risk level, the
maximization of return on investments in order that the fund
might realize the financial purposes of the pension system.
Portfolio selection efficiency," in other words, should be the
principal, if not the sole, objective of pension fund regulation.
B. SOCUL WELFARE IMPROVEMENT
1. Definitions
Some commentators argue that pension fund regulation
should seek social welfare improvements through fund invest-
ments which, for example, create employment opportunities,
increase housing, or further environmental protection.12 Before
discussing the viability of social welfare improvement as a con-
9. See PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 146; T. BLEAKNEY,
supra note 7, at 113-17; R& TmovE, supra note 6, at 139-40.
10. R. TiLOVE, supra note 6, at 140.
11. "An efficient portfolio is one that is fully diversified. For any given rate
of return, no other portfolio has less risk, and for a given level of risk, no other
portfolio provides superior returns." J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MAR-
KEr. THEOmES AND EVIDENCE 270 (1973).
12. See, e.g., J. RIFEIN & R. BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN: PENSION
POLITICS AND POWER IN THE 1980s (1978); Ferguson, Social Investing: An Advo-
cate's Perspective, in SHOULD PENSION ASSETS BE MANAGED FOR So-
cIAL/Po CAL PURPOSES? AN EBRI POLICY FORUM 93 (D. Salisbury ed. 1980);
Leibig, "You Can't Do That With My Money"--A Search for Mandatory Social
Responsibility in Pension Investments, 6 J. OF PENS. PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE
358 (1980); Ravikoff and Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and
the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1980). See also Pension Funds In-
vestments Outside New York Debated, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1982, at B-2, col. 1.
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trol objective of pension fund regulation, it is important first to
define the meaning of social welfare improvement in this
context.
As economists use the term, a social welfare improvement
is the creation of a private gain without any accompanying pri-
vate loss.' 3 Thus, in economic terms,-a social welfare improve-
ment through the investment of plan assets in home mortgages
to increase housing occurs only if plan participants or the plan
sponsor are not worse off as a result of the investment. In
other words, if the investment produces more housing and at
the same time maximizes value for the plan participants and
sponsor within an established level of risk, the investment will
have caused a social welfare improvement. On the other hand,
if such an investment subjects the fund to a higher level of risk
or results in a smaller expected return than the maximum ex-
pected return available for the fund's established risk level, no
social welfare improvement will occur. Despite the housing
gain, the plan participants and sponsor are worse off as a result
of the investment.
An investment that results in a social welfare improvement
in the economic sense is consistent with portfolio selection effi-
ciency under two circumstances. First, if two investments, A
and B, have the same financial characteristics,14 and invest-
ment A also benefits some individuals or groups not covered by
the plan, an investment in A produces social welfare improve-
ment in the economic sense since plan participants will receive
no less with investment A, nor incur any greater risk, than they
would with investment B.15 These investments are referred to
as financially comparable investments. Second, if investment
A benefits nonplan participants but has poorer financial char-
acteristics than investment B, and if investment A benefits
plan participants indirectly as members of a larger group to an
extent at least equal to the greater financial return, or the
13. See J. HIRSHLEiFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 521-24 (2d ed.
1980); P. LAYARD & A. WALTERS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 30 (1978).
14. The term "fmancial characteristics" refers to the risk, return and li-
quidity traits of an investment and its effect on a fund's diversification.
15. This is called by some the "all-things-being-equal" or "comparability"
criterion. See, e.g., SHOULD PENSION ASSETS BE MANAGED FOR SO-
ciAL/PoLrmCAL PURPOSES? AN EBRI POLICY FORUM 6, 23, 348, 356 (D. Salisbury
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as EBRI POLICY FORUM]; Hutchinson & Cole, Legal
Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political
Goals, 128 U. PENN. L. REV. 1340, 1367 (1980). The all-things-being-equal crite-
rion is also referred to as socially sensitive investing, id. at 1345, and as XX in-
vesting, Schotland, Should Pension Funds be Used to Achieve "Social" Goals?
(pt. 1), 119 TR. & EST. 10 (Sept. 1980).
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lesser risk, offered by investment B,16 investment in A pro-
duces a social welfare improvement. Such an investment is
called a collateral return investment.
Some advocates of social investing use the term "social
welfare" in a broader, noneconomic sense, however. These ad-
vocates argue that investments which produce certain gains for
nonplan participants should be made despite an accompanying
loss to plan participants. Under this view, socially responsible
investments are those "which either (1) permit the sacrifice of
safety, return, diversification, or marketability; or (2) are un-
dertaken to serve some objective that cannot be related to the
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries in that capacity
as such."17 According to this definition of social welfare im-
provement, the question of social desirability does not arise
when the relative return and risk factors of two potential in-
vestments are equal.18 Rather, the gain of one person or group
that is considered to outweigh an accompanying loss to others
is a social welfare improvement.' 9 In the noneconomic sense,
16. This is referred to as the collateral benefit criterion. See, e.g., Carter,
The Issue of National Policy, in SHOULD PENSION ASSETS BE MANAGED FOR SO-
CIAL/POLiTCAL PURPOSES? AN EBRI PoUcY FORUM 19, 23 (D. Salisbury ed.
1980); Ferguson, supra note 12, at 99; Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1368;
Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MicH. I REV. 72,
94 (1980).
17. Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1346. In his introduction to the
EBRI forum papers on social investing, Salisbury explains noneconomic social
welfare as follows:
The strongest advocates of social investing argue that economic re-
turn should be secondary to achieving "social" results ("political," "so-
cially dictated," or "divergent"). This view is set forth forcefully by
Barber and Rifkin, and it is this view that has elicited the strongest re-
sponse. Consistent with this approach, an interesting classification
system has been set forth by Marc Gertner to aid in discussing argu-
ments for accepting economic loss in order to achieve social/political
benefits. He described socially responsible investments "as those in-
vestments which: (1) carry a lesser rate of return and/or (2) have a
lower credit rating and quality and/or (3) have less liquidity or market-
ability than other forms of investment or specific investments readily
available in the marketplace, but which wilh (1) create employment
opportunities for plan participants and/or (2) have a greater social or
moral quality."
Salisbury, An Overview, in SHOULD PENSION ASSETS BE MANAGED FOR SO-
cIAL/PoLricAL PURPOSES? AN EBRI PoUCY FORUM 6 (D. Salisbury ed. 1980).
Investments in pursuit of social welfare improvement in a noneconomic sense
are referred to as socially dictated investments, Hutchinson & Cole, supra note
15, at 1346, and as divergent or alternative investments, Schotland, supra note
15, at 10.
18. See Salisbury, supra note 17, at 6.
19. See, e.g., N. HAMILTON & P. HAmILTON, GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC ENTER-
PRISE 50 (1981); P. LAYAID & A. WALTERS, supra note 13, at 30-31. See infra text
accompanying note 50.
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therefore, social welfare improvement is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the principal objective of pension fund regulation-
portfolio selection efficiency.
2. Economic Social Welfare Improvement
a. Financially Comparable Investments
If two investments are financially comparable, there can be
no objection on economic grounds to the selection of the invest-
ment that produces utility20 gains for nonplan participants,
since there is no loss to plan participants or the plan sponsor.
Some states have adopted social welfare improvement through
financially comparable investments2 1 as an objective for public
pension fund management through statutory provisions requir-
ing preference to be given local investments, "all other things
being equal."22 As one commentator notes, however, such "so-
cial" investing "is so obviously desirable that it must suffer
some flaw or it would sweep the field on its own."23 One obvi-
ous flaw is that there are not enough financially comparable so-
cial investment opportunities to enable pension funds to
pursue social welfare improvement effectively.24 As a result of
a limited market, the pursuit of social goals through plan fund
investments is likely to increase the fund's level of risk or re-
duce the fund's level of expected return in contravention of
portfolio selection efficiency. A pension fund consistently man-
aged in pursuit of social goals is likely to be less diversified
20. Utility is a term used by economists to refer to an individual's well-be-
ing or happiness. The authors of one economic text book explain that an indi-
vidual "has a happiness, or utility, function u that tells us how well off he
is.... ." P. LAYARD & A. WALTERs, supra note 13, at 5. Utility is technically de-
fined as "the variance whose relative magnitude indicates direction of prefer-
ence: In finding the most preferred position, the individual maximizes utility."
J. HIMSCHLEFER, supra note 13, at 66.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
22. Schotland, Should Pension Funds be Used to Achieve "Social" Goals?
(pt. 2), 119 TR. & EsT. 27, 28 (Oct. 1980). In an attempt to expand the investment
authority of the five state retirement systems and orient their investment poli-
cies toward enhancing the general welfare of the state and its citizens the Ohio
legislature recently added the following to its statute:
In exercising its fiduciary responsibility with respect to the invest-
ment of such funds, it shall be the intent of the board to give considera-
tion to investments that enhance the general welfare of the state and
its citizens where such investments offer quality return and safety
comparable to other investments currently available to the board. The
board shall adopt in regular meeting, policies, objectives or criteria for
the operation of the investment program.
Omo REV. CODE AxN. § 3309.15 (Page Supp. 1981).
23. Schotland, supra note 22, at 28.
24. Id. See also EBRI PoLIcv FoRuM, supra note 15, at 348.
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than a fund managed solely for the wealth maximization of the
fund's beneficiaries. Underdiversification results from sam-
pling error created by the limited number of potential invest-
ments and sampling bias caused by financially comparable
social investing criteria that exclude a disproportionate number
of investments in large firms concentrated in particular regions
and industries. 25 Underdiversification subjects a fund to firm
specific risks that adequate diversification would eliminate.2 6
The limited number of potential investments that satisfy
the financially comparable social investing criteria could also
adversely affect fund return. High demand for limited invest-
ment opportunities can raise the price of such stock above the
price it would command if investors considered only the
financial characteristics of the stock issuer. Investment in over-
valued stock means a lower return for the fund than it could
achieve through investment in properly priced stocks with the
same risk characteristics. High demand and consequent lower
return are particularly likely if managers of large funds seek in-
vestments in local firms or venture capital firms as part of a so-
cial investment program.
Even when social investment opportunities exist in a mar-
ket characterized by enough buyers, stocks, and transactions
that stock valuation is based on financial considerations, social
investing can affect fund return. A fund management governed
by social considerations is likely to generate higher research
and transaction costs because of a need to anticipate and re-
spond to changing corporate policies and changing perceptions
of social welfare. These additional costs translate into a lower
net return for funds seeking social welfare maximization than
for funds seeking only portfolio selection efficiency. 27
In addition to potential fund underdiversification and its at-
tendant economic loss to plan participants, the pursuit of social
welfare improvements through financially comparable invest-
ments raises serious trust law issues with respect to the fiduci-
ary's duty to manage trust funds for the exclusive benefit of the
trust's beneficiaries. 2 8 At the very least, this duty mandates in-
25. Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 85.
26. Firm specific or nonmarket risk is the risk attributable to the particular
business situation of a firm and is contrasted with systematic or market risk
which is the risk attributable to the industry or economy as a whole. The for-
mer is diversiflable, that is, it can be eliminated through an adequate mix of
securities in a portfolio. See generally J. LoRUE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 11,
at 275, 276; Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 79.
27. Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 93.
28. "The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
vestments that are primarily for the benefit of trust benefi-
ciaries. 29 Even under such an interpretation of the exclusive
benefit rule, investments that produce incidental benefits to a
third party arguably are permissible only if such investments
maximize the fund's return within a given risk level, the fiduci-
ary acts without any trace of self-interest, and the investments
produce an additional benefit for plan participants as members
of a larger group.30
Finally, implementing the social welfare improvement ob-
jective through financially comparable investments raises sev-
eral major problems. Among these are problems in defining
social goals, creating a system of distinctive weights to make
solely in the interest of the beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 170(1) (1959). Comment q to § 170(1) provides:
Action in the interest of a third person. The trustee is under a duty
to the beneficiary in administering the trust not to be guided by the in-
terest of any third person. Thus, it is improper for the trustee to sell
trust property to a third person for the purpose of benefiting the third
person rather than the trust estate.
Id. comment q. For a discussion of the various trust law issues raised by social
investing, see PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, .supra note 8, at 192-94; Hutchinson
& Cole, supra note 15, at 1359.
29. For example, the trustees of the United Mine Workers pension fund in-
vested significant fund assets in certain electric utility companies to assist the
union in its efforts to buy control of the utilities and force them to burn union-
mined coal. Although the investments may have benefited plan beneficiaries,
since fund receipts were directly related to the tonnage of union-mined coal,
the court found that the investments were made '"primarily for the collateral
benefit they gave the union." The investments thus "present a clear case of
self-dealing on the part of the trustees, ... and constituted a breach of trust."
Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1106 (D.D.C. 1971), arcd, 511 F.2d 447
(D.C. Cir. 1975). In Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. of New York, 447 F.
Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979), the purchase of
city bonds as part of a financial plan to stave off the city's potential bankruptcy
was found to be prudent. The court stated-
[N] either the protection of the jobs of the City's teachers nor the gen-
eral public welfare were factors which motivated the trustees in their
investment decision. The extension of aid to the City was simply a
means-the only means, in their assessment-to the legitimate end of
preventing the exhaustion of the assets of the TRS in the interest of all
of the beneficiaries. Notably, the importance of the solvency of the
City to the TRS lay not only in its role as the major contributor of
funds but also as the ultimate guarantor of the payment of pension
benefits to participants in the TRS ....
Id. at 126. In their discussion of the exclusive-benefit test, two commentators
pointed out*
Although the exclusive-benefit rule of the Internal Revenue Code
obviously applies to the investment of plan assets, historically it has
not been a stringent constraint.... The Internal Revenue Service has
interpreted the exclusive-benefit rule to permit some collateral benefit
to other persons, so long as the investments have the primary purpose
of benefiting employees or their beneficiaries.
Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1348.
30. Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1367.
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the pursuit of inconsistent social goals operational, collecting
and using data needed to identify investments that satisfy est-
ablished financial and social criteria, and evaluating the per-
formance of those charged with all these tasks. The nature and
effect of such implementation problems are explored later in
this part.3 ' At this point, it suffices to say that the severity of
these problems raises serious questions regarding the desira-
bility and feasibility of social welfare improvement, no matter
how defined, as a control objective of pension fund regulation.
b. Collateral Return Investments
Investments that produce utility gains for nonplan partici-
pants but sacrifice fund return or risk levels theoretically can.
comply with portfolio selection criteria if they produce nonfi-
nancial returns for plan participants as members of a larger
group benefited by the investments. As long as the present
value of the collateral benefit of an investment to plan partici-
pants equals or exceeds the present value forgone by not in-
vesting in another investment with a higher expected financial
return, the same risk level and no collateral benefit to plan par-
ticipants, investment in the former is at least theoretically con-
sistent with portfolio selection efficiency.32
Investing in local firms, for example, strengthens the local
economy, results in a larger and stronger tax base, and enables
local government to maintain or increase city services, create
new jobs, and postpone tax rate increases. Plan participants
share in these benefits as residents and taxpayers. Another
commonly cited example of a collateral benefit is employment
security. Thus, employees faced with losing their jobs because
of a factory closing might induce their employer to stay by
loaning plan funds to the employer at more favorable terms
than are otherwise available. 33 The increased risk to the plan
fund arguably is offset by greater employment security. Still
31. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
32. It is important to note that portfolio selection efficiency through collat-
eral as well as financial return is meaningful in the context of defined benefit
plans only if all parties involved in such plans understand that the promised
benefits expressed in terms of dollars mean a defined dollar amount less collat-
eral returns which have been, are currently being, or will be received by plan
participants. Otherwise, the application of the collateral benefit theory to de-
fined benefit plans increases the employer's costs and liabilities to the extent
that financial returns are foregone for collateral returns. Furthermore, to the
extent that the plan sponsor cannot or will not meet such increased costs and
satisfy its increased liabilities, employees lose at least a portion of their ex-
pected retirement income.
33. Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 90.
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another example of benefits collateral to an investment's
financial return is the emotional or psychological satisfaction
plan participants derive from the knowledge that pension funds
are being invested in socially beneficial projects like low-in-
come housing for the poor.34
Nonetheless, the collateral benefit justification for social
welfare maximization through pension funds has obvious
problems. The fund manager, for example, must determine
what collateral benefits derive from various investments and
trace these benefits to individual plan participants of the partic-
ular pension fund. In addition, the fund manager needs a sys-
tem for quantifying collateral benefits, determining the values
each plan participant places on the collateral benefits, and rec-
onciling the differences among values. 35 These determinations,
assuming they can be made, must be constantly reviewed and
modified to comport with the changing needs and values of
plan participants. As discussed in the next section of this part,
costs attendant to making, reviewing, and modifying these de-
terminations render social welfare maximization through fund
management administratively infeasible.
In addition, the collateral benefits received through social
investments may not be consistent with the interests of all plan
participants. For example, local investments could, in fact, cre-
ate or strengthen firms that are competitors of firms employing
plan participants. One result of such investing could be a loss
of jobs for current employees. Investing in the plan partici-
pants' employer might create a collateral benefit of greater em-
ployment security for workers, but produce no benefit for
retirees.36 In fact, if such investments increase fund risk or re-
duce the solvency of the fund assets, retirees could receive
smaller retirement benefit checks or, even worse, no checks at
all. Even if social investments produce collateral benefits, such
benefits will be diluted, since plan participants receive only a
34. See generally J. HmSHLET R, supra note 13, at 84. Langbein and Pos-
ner refer to such emotional or psychological satisfaction as consumption value
as distinguished from investment value. Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at
94. They point out that "it is strongly implied by economic theory, that people
who choose to invest in mutual funds dedicated to social investing derive a con-
sumption value from their investment, since the pure investment value is, at
least on an expected basis, inferior to that of alternative investment vehicles."
Id.
35. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 95; Salisbury, supra note 17,
at 12.
36. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 90. See also EBRI PoLcy Fo-
RUM, supra note 15, at 12, 24.
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fraction of the benefit produced for a larger group. Thus, ab-
sent a unique set of circumstances, it is unlikely that social in-
vestment gains in the form of collateral benefits to plan
participants will in fact offset losses in foregone financial
returns.
Finally, a strong public policy argument can be made that
workers should not be able to trade a portion of their future re-
tirement income for present collateral returns. Substituting
collateral benefits for a portion of financial return may leave
plan participants without enough retirement income in later
years to meet minimum subsistence levels, forcing some of
them to turn to public welfare for support. To protect society's
resources from such additional burdens, retirement plans
should focus exclusively on supplying retirees with retirement
income, rather than on generating diluted, nonfinancial collat-
eral benefits. 37
3. Noneconomic Social Welfare Improvement
Social welfare improvement in the noneconomic sense may
be illustrated by the home mortgage investment hypothetical
used earlier. If home mortgage investments aimed at increas-
ing housing opportunities for the community subject the pen-
sion fund to a higher level of risk or result in a smaller
expected return than the maximum expected return available
for the fund's established risk level, plan participants and the
plan sponsor will incur a loss.3 8 Notwithstanding the loss to
plan participants, the housing gain to others constitutes a so-
37. The same rationale is used in part to justify state blue sky laws. For
example, a well-informed individual who fully understands the nature of high
risk securities may still desire to invest in such securities in the hope of realiz-
ing high returns. Investment losses from such high risk securities may put
such an individual's financial status below the minimum welfare sustenance
level, however. Since such a person would pose an additional burden to soci-
ety's welfare programs, the prohibition of the sale of certain high risk securities
may be appropriate to achieve the legitimate goal of preventing such a poten-
tially harmful investment. See I. Coffey, Securities Regulation Policy and
Analysis, 581 f (1978) (unpublished multilith, available at Case W. Res. Univ.
School of Law).
After proposing a "social option fund" for defined contribution plans into
which an employee could elect to have contributions made for his or her ac-
count, Langbein and Posner note that "those who believe that it is sound social
policy to discourage individuals from trading future retirement benefits for cur-
rent consumption will have a ground for continuing to oppose social investing
even in the voluntaristic mode that we have endorsed." Langbein & Posner,
supra note 16, at 107.
38. See infra text accompanying note 50. During the hearings of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Pension Policy one speaker noted that an involuntary
wealth redistribution can occur between investors excluded from a segment of
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cial welfare improvement only if that term is defined in a
noneconomic sense. Noneconomic social welfare improvement
is the involuntary redistribution of wealth on the basis of a col-
lective judgment that the gain to one person or group out-
weighs the accompanying loss to another.
The pursuit of social welfare improvement in this broader,
noneconomic sense requires pension fund managers to identify
the goals that individual members of society regard as desira-
ble.39 After identifying social goals, fund managers must meas-
ure and balance the private gains and losses associated with
pursuing a number of competing goals and set priorities to de-
termine which goals to seek through pension fund manage-
ment.40 To establish priorities among competing goals, plan
management must have a set of explicit weights to attach to
the welfare levels of different groups in society. Economists
are not yet able, and it is difficult to imagine elected executives
or legislatures being able, to give regulators such a set of dis-
tributive weights to apply mechanically in the decisionmaking
process of investing pension funds.41 Thus, regulators are left
to create their own system of weights.42
the capital market due to social welfare improvement criteria and investors not
so excluded. The speaker stated:
If you constrain the flow of funds in any mandatory way, what hap-
pens is that money will still flow there from people who are not con-
strained and they will get windfall profits because others are
constrained from playing in that area. So when you set up these
mandatory barriers to funds flowing in certain directions, what hap-
pens is it creates windfall profits for those who can avoid those barriers
and it does constitute somewhat of a tax on the people who are prohib-
ited from investing in certain areas. The tax really amounts to a
wealth transfer between the two kinds of investors.
EBRI Poucy FORUM, supra note 15, at 354.
39. Professor Schotland lists this requirement as the first of seven acute
problems in implementing social welfare improvement as a control objective of
pension fund investment activity:
Problem One. Which divergent goals shall be pursued? Consider.
equal employment opportunity in terms of race, sex, age, et al.; occupa-
tional safety and health; consumer protection; unionization; environ-
mental protection; energy conservation; discouraging involvement in
countries violating human rights; inner-city redevelopment; housing
small business; local or regional development.
Schotland, supra note 22, at 30.
40. It should be noted that the establishment of priorities to rank multiple
social goals "is not merely a matter of the finitude of resources .... [W]hat
happens if a pension system decides it wants both to promote equal employ-
ment opportunity and to discourage involvement in South Africa, and finds that
a firm at the forefront of equal employment opportunity also is involved in
South Africa?" Id.
41. See R SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MoNoPOrLs 20-21
(1979).
42. Id. at 21.
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To identify social goals and devise a system of distributive
weights that reflects society's values, regulators need to know
the interests of all potential utility gainers and losers associ-
ated with implementing any wealth redistribution scheme
under consideration. 43 Then, they must evaluate the argu-
ments of the affected parties in the context of a vast amount of
information in such varied disciplines as economics, ethics, so-
ciology, psychology, and political science. Finally, the regula-
tors need to disseminate their findings and decisions to society
with the ability to respond quickly to changes in societal
views.44
There are significant problems in assigning such tasks to
pension plan regulators. First, the needed information, even if
obtained,45 may well be nonfunctional because of its quantity,
variety, and complexity.4 6 Second, the cost of performing these
tasks is likely to be prohibitive. Furthermore, given the nature
of the tasks involved in formulating and implementing social
policy, regulators must have broad discretionary authority,
which increases the opportunity for special interest dominance
and arbitrary action or inaction by regulators. 47
Social welfare improvement issues are more appropriately
decided by the political process than by a bureaucratic admin-
43. "[T]he problem of setting natural monopoly prices so as to take ac-
count of the differential effects of price changes on different groups in the econ-
omy" offers a useful analogy since "[i]t requires the ability to evaluate the
ultimate incidence on various groups of consumers of prices charged business."
Id. at 20-21.
44. That such changes occur is obvious from the fact that "there are [so-
cial] goals that evidently don't interest today's advocates of divergent investing,
such as discouraging production of alcohol and tobacco and war material. [The
latter] goal, which stirred such activity against Dow Chemical only a few years
ago, seems forgotten." Schotland, supra note 22, at 30.
45. The problem of obtaining all the necessary information relevant to so-
cial policy decisions should not be underestimated. For example:
The lack of information on which to base investment decisions aimed
at furthering divergent goals is severe. The fact that "[t] here is no sys-
tematic method for obtaining and evaluating information about the ac-
tivities and practices of companies in which the funds invest" is
deemed the first of three respects in which "the current decisionmak-
ing framework appears inadequate" from the perspective of one of the
best studies advocating alternative investing.
Schotland, supra note 22, at 31-32. Furthermore, even if one can obtain such
data as GE's relations with the EEOC, or GM's with OSHA, one cannot "make
a decision about whether GE or GM is notably good, or notably bad without
having data on comparable firms." Id. at 32.
46. See generally Coffey, Book Review, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 268, 278-79 (1975).
47. R. SCHmALENSEE, supra note 41, at 17; Schotland, supra note 22, at 36.
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istrator. 48 A broad based body of elected representatives is a
more likely forum for the systematic presentation and consid-
eration of the needs and preferences of individuals and groups
within society. Furthermore, the political process is better
equipped to coordinate decisions about various social poli-
cies.49 Defining and implementing social policy in light of com-
peting societal needs and interests is the business of elected
representatives. In contrast, social policy decisions are unre-
lated to the pension fund manager's task of providing plan par-
ticipants with promised benefits from available fund assets.
Finally, a collective decision to pursue a particular scheme
of wealth redistribution should be made and implemented di-
rectly and openly. Using pension funds to further noneconomic
social welfare improvements constitutes a hidden subsidization
by plan participants and taxpayers of other segments of soci-
ety.50 For example, social investing may require taxpayers and
plan participants to increase their contributions to enable a
pension fund to promote housing opportunities through mort-
gage or construction industry investments that reduce the
fund's return. It may also cause plan participants to forego
benefit increases because of decreased financial return on fund
assets. The process of redistributing wealth through indirect
subsidization impedes responsible review of the individuals
who are deciding the relative merits of individual utility gains
and losses on behalf of society.5 1 Significantly, to the extent
that social welfare maximization through pension fund regula-
tion creates hidden subsidization, it constitutes an "effort to
take money from the elderly, who themselves need financial
aid as much or more than any other group."5 2
48. See generally R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 41, at 14, 17, 21-22. See also
Langbein & Posner, supra note 16, at 111-12.
49. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 41, at 14, 21-22. Failure to coordinate
policy decisions can result in what Professor Schotland calls "interference."
That is, the impact of the social investing policies of a pension fund may be ef-
fectively negated by inconsistent state policies. For example, despite a fund
loan to a firm aimed at attracting or keeping the firm, the adverse tax structure
of the state may result in that firm locating elsewhere. In summary, without
effective policy decision coordination, "[d]ivergent investors not only face in-
surmountable obstacles in deciding what to do, how to do it, and whether doing
it will matter, but other parts of their own team may be running inconsistent
plays." Schotland, Should Pension Funds be Used to Achieve "Social" Goals?
(pt. 3), 119 TR. & EST. 26, 27 (Nov. 1980).
50. See generally Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. &
MGmrT. Sci. 22 (1971).
51. Id. at 43-44.
52. Schotland, supra note 22, at 28. It should be noted that use of public
pension funds to effect such an involuntary wealth redistribution may consti-
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Although other social goals may be as important as provid-
ing retirement income for workers, they should not be con-
sciously pursued through pension fund regulation. Pension
fund regulation can directly affect the availability of funds for
providing retirement income for public employees. Tax incen-
tives, such as tax abatement or industrial revenue bond pro-
grams, can have a more profound and direct effect on business
development within a community than pension fund regula-
tion.5 3 Furthermore, those in charge of public pension funds
should not have to decide conflicts among competing social
goals or conflicts between portfolio selection efficiency and
noneconomic social welfare improvements. To promote admin-
istrative efficiency, to avoid arbitrary actions by regulators and
special interest group dominance over regulators, and to pre-
vent hidden subsidizations of other groups in society by plan
beneficiaries and taxpayers, social welfare improvement should
be rejected as an objective of pension fund regulation.5 4
1I. REGULATORY LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. BACKGROUND
Once the plan sponsor-in the case of public plans, the gov-
ernment-identifies the purpose of its retirement plan and the
proper control objective of fund regulation, the next step is the
development of a regulatory framework that will foster the ob-
jective chosen for the plan. The critical issue here is what ma-
trix of laws, organizational structure, powers and duties, and
motivating factors will encourage the parties involved in fund
management to strive for and achieve portfolio efficiency.
There are essentially two structures for the control of pub-
lic enterprises.5 5 One is the government department form; the
tute a taking of property without due process or an unconstitutional impair-
ment of contractual obligations. See, e.g., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 7-13.
53. See EBRI PoucY FORUM, supra note 15, at 355; IL SCHMALENSEE, supra
note 41, at 19; Schotland, supra note 49, at 29-30. See also Posner, supra note 50,
at 47.
54. Similarly, scholars have argued that economic efficiency should be the
sole objective of antitrust policy, R. BoRic, THE ANTrrEUST PARADoX: A PoLicY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); . POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TIVE (1976), the control of natural monopoly, . SCHMALENSEE, supra note 41,
and the regulation of mass transit, N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19.
55. The company form, whereby a government firm registers as a limited
liability company under private corporation laws, has no real relevance for a
government entity operating a public employee retirement system. For a dis-
cussion of the company form uses, see United Nations Technical Assistance
Administration, Some Problems in the Organization and Administration of
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other is the public corporation form. Generally speaking, the
government department form is characterized as follows:
[D]irect responsibility on all matters devolves on the director of the
department and ultimately on the chief executive of the government.
Direct government control of operations is exercised by executive or-
der and legislative review. Personnel are usually subject to civil serv-
ice regulation. The enterprise is financed by annual appropriations and
is subject to the budget, accounting, and audit controls applicable to
other government activities. The enterprise frequently possesses the
sovereign immunity of the state.
5 6
The second public enterprise structure, the public corporation
form,57 although encompassing many variations, is generally
characterized by its own board of directors, financing, budget,
accounting and auditing procedures, as well as the capacity to
sue and be sued in its own name. The public corporation, how-
ever, is created by the legislature and is subject to government
control as provided in the enabling statute.
Both .the department and public corporation forms have
widely recognized deficiencies. The major problems in depart-
ment form enterprises are informational poverty, response lag,
and a high degree of operating inflexibility due to strong pres-
sures to conform to standard government regulations and pro-
cedures. 8 Operating inflexibility leads to the informational
poverty and response lag which ultimately translate into lost
opportunities and higher costs. The public corporation over-
comes the problems of the department form through its auton-
omy from the extent of government control inherent in the
department form.59 A major problem in the governance of pub-
lic corporations exists, however, because "there is no consis-
tent pattern or coherent theory addressing the issues of policy
formation and efficient operation."6 0 This problem is apparent
in public employee retirement systems which are administered,
with a few exceptions, by governing boards rather than govern-
ment departments. 61 A unique aspect of public pension plans
Public Enterprises in the Industrial Field at 12-15, U.N. Doc. ST/TAA/M/7
(1954) [hereinafter cited as United Nations Report].
56. N. HAMiLTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 72. See United Nations
Report, supra note 55, at 5-9.
57. For detailed discussions of the public corporation form, see United Na-
tions Report, supra note 55, at 9-11; N. HAmiLTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19,
at 72, 75-84.
58. See United Nations Report, supra note 55, at 6-8; N. HAMILTON & P.
HAMiLTON, supra note 19, at 73-75.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
60. N. HAmILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 78.
61. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 65; T. BLEAKNEY, supra
note 7, at 148.
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is "the reluctance or inability of one legislature or administra-
tion to commit its successors to a particular policy or course of
action .... -62 Thus, many retirement systems lack any coher-
ent policy framework.63 Furthermore, the political arena in
which public plans exist has resulted in the ad hoc develop-
ment of public pension systems through a complex and confus-
ing patchwork of laws and programs.64 Not surprisingly, the
nature and extent of the board's duties, which "range from
making fundamental policy decisions to handling minute ad-
ministrative details," depend on "the traditional and political
environment in which the system operates" in addition to the
system's size and staff.65 The lack of a clearly developed pro-
cess with well defined lines of authority for policymaking has
produced a plethora of administrative inefficiencies culminat-
ing in inequitable benefit structures, escalating costs, and
financial instability.66
The following section analyzes the existing structure and
process used in the governance of the Minnesota State Board
of Investment and the Ohio School Employees Retirement Sys-
tem.67 It identifies the problems in these and other systems
and establishes the need for a modified regulatory framework
designed to further the control objective of portfolio efficiency.
B. EXISTMG FRAMEWORK
1. Governance Structure
As with most public employee retirement systems, the
Ohio School Employees Retirement System (SERS) vests the
general administration and management of the system in a
retirement board.68 The board consists of two ex officio mem-
bers, the state auditor and the attorney general, and three
elected participants.6 9 The board hires an executive director,7 0
62. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 63.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. T. BLEAKNEY, supra note 7, at 148-49.
66. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 80.
67. The findings are based on the author's case studies of these two sys-
tems involving a review of relevant statutes, system reports and publications,
board resolutions, personal interviews with several individuals active in various
aspects of the systems' operations, and independent studies on the subject.
Observations of retirement systems in general are based on several major stud-
ies of public employee retirement systems. See, e.g., PENSION TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 8; T. BLEAKNEY, supra note 7; R. TiLOvE, supra note 6.
68. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.04 (Page 1980).
69. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.05 (Page 1980). The three elected mem-
bers currently are the business manager of the Cleveland School Board, a
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who falls within a newly enacted definition of fiduciary,7 1 but
who is given no specific statutory duties or powers.
Although Minnesota's retirement systems are run by re-
tirement boards, the investment responsibility for the systems
resides in the State Board of Investment (SBI). The SBI con-
sists of five constitutional officers.72 - A statutorily created In-
vestment Advisory Council (IAC) advises the SBI and the
executive director on general investment policy.7 3 The execu-
tive director is appointed by the SBI and is responsible for
planning, directing, coordinating, and executing administrative
and investment functions in conformity with the policies and
directives of the SBI.74 The executive director must be an ex-
perienced investment professional. 75
The most obvious deficiency in the retirement board gov-
ernance structure, even with the modifications that exist in the
Minnesota system, is the lack of board knowledge or expertise
in investment, banking, and finance.7 6 Although the board can
hire investment advisors77 to aid it in fulfilling its investment
responsibilities, the board bears ultimate responsibility for es-
tablishing investment policy, choosing an investment manager,
communicating that policy and guidelines for its implementa-
tion to the investment manager, and measuring and reviewing
the performance of its manager. At the Very least, these tasks
require a basic working knowledge of financial and investment
school secretary, and a school bus driver who is a farmer, insurance salesman,
and a member of the board of directors of a farm co-operative insurance pro-
gram. Interview with Thomas R. Anderson, Executive Director, School Em-
ployees Retirement System of Ohio, in Columbus, Ohio (Aug. 5, 1981).
70. OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.11 (Page 1980).
71. OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.01 (Page Supp. 1981).
72. MrNN. STAT. §§ 11A.03-.04 (1980).
73. MIm. STAT. § 11A.08 (1980) (amended 1981).
74. MINN. STAT. § 11A.07 (1980).
75. Id.
76. PEAT, MARWICK, MrrCHELL & Co., MINNESOTA STATE BOARD OF INVEST-
MENT:. PART II REPORT, VOL. 2: GOVERNANCE OF THE MINNESOTA STATE BOARD
OF INVESTMENT 24, 27-28 (Aug. 1981) [hereinafter cited as PAM PART 11 RE-
FORT]. "Less than I percent of all retirement system boards have members
who are persons employed outside of government in fields related to the invest-
ment, banldng, or finance field." PENSION TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at
67. This "absence of specialized investment boards no doubt generates certain
deficiencies in asset management and investment." Id- at 189. For a discussion
of the necessary areas of specialized technical expertise, see T. BLEAKNEY,
supra note 7, at 151-55.
77. MINN. STAT. § 11A.04 (1980); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.14 (Page 1980).
"Increasingly, retirement boards have been turning to both in-house and
outside professional advice and management in the management area." PEN-
SION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 66.
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concepts and theories. Even if the board uses advisors and the
executive director to formulate and recommend policies and
procedures, board members need sufficient knowledge to evalu-
ate recommendations and to choose among alternative propos-
als. A lack of fundamental investment experience and
knowledge can lead to one of two undesirable situations. First,
the board may simply not perform the tasks of policy creation
and communication, management oversight, and performance
evaluation, resulting in inefficient portfolio management. Sec-
ond, the executive director, board advisors, or government offi-
cials will perform these tasks in response to various interest
groups. Portfolio management by these persons will relegate
the board to the status of a rubber stamp for the acts of others
over whom it has effectively lost control.78 The inevitable re-
sult is conflicting policies and confusion over lines of authority,
which translate again into inefficient portfolio management.79
Time demands placed on many board members, particu-
larly government officials who serve as ex officio board mem-
bers, exacerbate the problems created by the lack of requisite
board expertise.80 Because of the numerous and varied respon-
sibilities of their government positions, government officials
may lack the time and interest to devote to board duties.8 1 In
78. A recent study of Minnesota's State Board of Investment observed that
"past and current practices tend to document the shift of authority from the
SBI to either the Executive Director or the IAC." PEAT, MARwIIC, MrrCHELL &
Co., MINNESOTA STATE BOARD OF INVESTmENT. PART I REPORT IV-4 (Apr. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as PMM PART I REPORT]. For example, "until 1978, interpre-
tation of the statutory limitations into informal investment policies was left to
the Executive Director." PMM PART H REPORT, supra note 76, at 10. Similarly,
a commentary on the regulation of mass transit concluded that "the [transit]
boards in many of the case studies are only titularly carrying out their poli-
cymaking and monitoring functions.... [I]t is actually transit management
who designs the policies, and the policies are rubberstamped by the board with
minor or no alterations." N. HAmiLTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 27.
79. The Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell Report warns that the development
within Minnesota of the "exercise of authority by a sub-set of those making up
the governance body... can lead to a breakdown in the deliberative process,
ineffective direction and control, confusion as to the real seat of authority and
misunderstandings." PMM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at IV-4.
80. "In the vast majority of cases, government officials achieve board mem-
bership on an ex officio basis. Only in a small percentage of plans are they
elected by plan members." PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 67.
81. See T. BLEAKNEY, supra note 7, at 149. Although the Peat, Marwick and
Mitchell Report supports the board membership of state constitutional officers
as elected representatives of taxpayers who bear the ultimate liability for pen-
sion payments, it notes that "it must be recognized ... that these officials have
multiple responsibilities to perform in state government, and that each officer's
role as fiduciary for the investment process is only one of many other functions
that he or she must fulfill" PMM PART II REPORT, supra note 76, at 27.
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Ohio, for example, until the present attorney general made
changes, there was little continuity in the attorney general's
representative at SERS board meetings. 82 In Minnesota, most
of the SBI's members do not even send representatives regu-
larly to the IAC meetings.83 A lack of commitment by board
members because of other demands on their time or interests
leads to the same problems created by lack of knowledge and
expertise in fields essential to the efficient management of fund
assets.
Finally, another impediment to efficient portfolio manage-
ment in many public retirement systems is the politicization of
the governance structure.84 Because board members are often
government officials whose election to state office is often whol-
ly unrelated to board policies, the board may have members
who are not particularly interested in board affairs.85 In addi-
tion, the board may be deprived of a knowledgeable, committed
member because his or her continued membership is depen-
dent upon reelection to state office rather than upon his or her
contribution to the board. Furthermore, the political nature of
government office subjects ex officio board members to pres-
sure from various interest groups that could affect their views
and positions with respect to fund investments. For example, a
policy of favoring instate investments or excluding investments
in nonunion companies may attract needed political support for
reelection to state office, but it may have a deleterious effect on
efficient fund management.
2. Governance Process
In theory, a board having general responsibility for the re-
tirement system is to establish the policy of the pension pro-
82. Interview with Thomas R. Anderson, supra note 69.
83. Interview with Lawrence A. Martin, Executive Secretary, Legislative
Commission on Pensions and Retirement, in St. Paul, Minn. (Aug. 11, 1981).
84. In Minnesota, for example, "[t]here has been a trend toward increasing
politicization of the SBL" PMM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at 4. This report
attributes much of the controversy surrounding the SBI to the "change from an
Executive Director who was more effective in dealing with political issues to
one whose skills lie more in the investment area." Id. at 5. To a great extent,
the role of the executive director in many systems is political since "[t] he time
and attention of the plan administrator is demanded by legislative bodies,
elected officials, various boards and commissions, employee representatives,
and other special interests." PENSION TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 68.
See also T. BLEAKNEY, supra note 7, at 150-51, for a discussion of the political
nature of the executive director's job. In Ohio the executive director acts as the
liaison between the board and the legislature. Interview with Thomas R. An-
derson, supra note 69.
85. See supra note 76.
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gram and oversee the executive director's daily management of
the system.86 Based on the Minnesota experience, however,
practice does not always reflect theory.87 The reaction of those
familiar with the SBI is that it has made little effort to formu-
late policy and provide direction for its staff.88 The result has
been that the executive director has controlled investment
practices without formal board monitoring of investment re-
sults.89 The IAC, which was established to assist the SBI in in-
vestment policy, has been underutilized by the SBI and has
worked more closely with the executive director than the
86. A relatively new Minnesota statute expressly sets forth such a govern-
ance process by requiring the SBI to "[flormulate policies and procedures
deemed necessary and appropriate to carry out its functions" and to
"[e]stablish a formula or formulas to measure management performance and
return on investment." MN N. STAT. § 11A.04 (1980). The SBI also must hire an
executive director who is "well qualified by training to administer and invest
the money available for investment and possess experience in the management
of institutional investment portfolios." MINN. STAT. § 11A.07 (1980). In contrast,
the Ohio statute sets no specific qualification requirements for the executive di-
rector. The Minnesota executive director in turn must "[p]lan, direct, coordi-
nate and execute administrative and investment functions in conformity with
the policies and directives of the state board." MINN. STAT. § 11A.07 (1980). Al-
though not as detailed, the Ohio statute authorizes the SERS board to "adopt
rules and ... authorize its administrative officers, or committees... to act for
the board in accord with such policies .... ." OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.04
(Page 1980). A newly enacted amendment directs the board to "adopt... poli-
cies, objectives or criteria for the operation of the investment program." Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.15 (Page Supp. 1981).
87. "While the policy roles of each of these three entities [SBI, IAC, and
Executive Director] are defined in the statutes, the actual policy-making prac-
tice, as it has evolved over a number of years, is at some variance with the stat-
utory description." PMM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at 1-2. Accord
Interview with Lawrence A. Martin, supra note 83. See also infra note 175.
88. For example, when the present Minnesota state auditor became a
member of the SBI, he found it "essentially lacking in goals and objectives."
Interview with Arne H. Carlson, State Auditor, in St. Paul, Minn. (Aug. 13,
1981). The Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell study made similar observations, con-
cluding that "the absence of formal policies left the SBI staff with no direction."
PMM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at IV-8. In fact, until a few years ago,
board meeting minutes reflected "little discussion or direct involvement in pol-
icy considerations by the SBI, either as a result of questions from the Execu-
tive Director or through its own initiative." PMM PART II REPORT, supra note
76, at 10. In Ohio's SERS, the initiative for most investment related policies
comes from the executive director. Interview with Thomas R. Anderson, supra
note 69. For example, the investment policy statement included in the SERS
1979 Investment Report "for the use of the system's investment staff and coun-
selors" was written by the board's legal counsel, investment advisor, and exec-
utive director. Risk levels for common stock are set annually by the board
through a process of "general understanding in discussion with equity advi-
sors." Id. Proposals for benefit increases, on the other hand, generally are ini-
tiated by the board.
89. PMM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at IV-3.
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board.90 As a practical matter, the executive director has been
the SBI's sole source of information when reviewing strategy
and its implementation. Thus, the executive director has be-
come the dominant force in establishing policy for the board's
retirement funds.91
Communication between the SBI and the executive direc-
tor has been inadequate. Because the board is given informa-
tion consisting of unorganized excessive detail and statistics, it
is difficult for the SBI to ask relevant and meaningful questions
of the staff.92 At the same time, the board has not received
some information necessary to function properly.9 3 The ab-
sence of regular and full communication and discussion be-
tween the board and its executive director severely hampers
the effective administration of a retirement system by depriv-
ing the board of information essential to formulating appropri-
ate policies and realistic investment goals, monitoring and
evaluating performance in an intelligent and objective manner,
and instituting appropriate changes in personnel and opera-
tions. Communication deficiencies also sow the seeds of mis-
understandings, lack of confidence, and even distrust, thereby
transforming the administration of the system into an adver-
sarial rather than a cooperative process. 94
The SBI has also lacked any formal procedures for evaluat-
ing management performance.95 Without clearly stated and
formally adopted policies, it is very difficult for the board to es-
tablish vehicles for measuring performance. 96 Without policies
and performance standards, board expectations are not under-
stood by fund managers and the board has no basis upon which
90. Id. at 1-5. In June of 1980, however, the SBI asked the IAC for advice
on asset mix, performance objectives, and communications. PMIVI PART 11 RE-
PORT, supra note 76, at 9. In October of 1980, the IAC issued recommended
guidelines for each of the retirement funds. Id.
91. See PMM PART I REPORT, supra note 76, at 13.
92. PAM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at IV-7; Interview with Arne H.
Carlson, supra note 88.
93. For example, for a period of time the board had no knowledge of the
existence of staff contracts with external vendors for performance measure-
ment studies and reports. Interview with Arne H. Carlson, supra note 88. Sim-
ilarly, until 1979, total return of the funds managed by the SBI were not
reported to the board by the executive director. PMM PART I REPORT, supra
note 76, at 15.
94. PMM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at IV-11-12.
95. PMM PART II REPORT, supra note 76, at 19.
96. OFFICE OF THE STATE AuDrroR, SUMMARY OF REPORT ON STATE BOARD
OF INVESTMENT 4 (Oct. 27, 1980); PlM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at IV-8;
PMM PART II REPORT, supra note 76, at 16.
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to judge the effectiveness of management.9 7 Although SBI min-
utes include salary reviews for the executive director and de-
bates on the merits of the director's performance, there is no
evidence that SBI decisions regarding the executive director
were based on a formal evaluation of the director's perform-
ance and capabilities.98 A lack of direction, expectations, and
objective evaluation techniques fosters an attitude by a man-
ager that a good performance is simply avoiding trouble, which
is best accomplished by making money and avoiding contro-
versy or scandal.99 Thus, the board's task of monitoring and
evaluating management performance becomes a reactive func-
tion. Such a situation perpetuates mediocre performance and
encourages inappropriate reactions when the board is faced
with fund losses or public criticism. Since there is no rational
system for inquiry into the reasons for fund losses or criti-
cisms, the board cannot effectively consider whether personnel
or operational changes are warranted.O0
The inefficiencies in the internal operation of the Minne-
sota system are compounded by state statutory requirements,
which also exist in Ohio, that restrict investment flexibility by
limiting investments to specified categories.1Ol The statutes in
both states, however, were amended last year to broaden the
categories of permissible investments.102 Minnesota substan-
97. PMIM PART I REPORT, supra note 78, at WV-9. A study of public transit
systems discovered that without system policies "[b]usywork itself becomes a
goal" of management. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 28. One
interviewee went so far as to admit "[w]e sometimes come to the office and
have no idea of what we want to do for the day." Furthermore, board evalua-
tion of management performance necessarily is subjective when there are no
policies which can serve as the basis for performance standards. Id. at 30.
98. PMM PART II REPORT, supra note 76, at 19.
99. "As long as management meets the budget constraint and is not in-
volved in public scandal, it appears secure." N. HAMILTON & P. HAMmTON,
supra note 19, at 30. One pension system executive director states that doing a
good job means "number one, make sure money is wisely and productively in-
vested and avoid scandals." Interview with Thomas R. Anderson, supra note
69. Examples of situations that would lead to the firing of an executive director
include appropriation of fund assets for personal use, too close a link to a par-
ticular broker, and failure to disburse retirement checks in a timely fashion, or
delay in answering correspondence. Id.
1 00. See A. WILIAMS III, MANAGING YOUR INVESTMENT MANAGER 217-21
(1980) for a general discussion of a rational procedure for reviewing investment
results, the possible reasons for poor investment performance, and the appro-
priate response in each case.
101. MINN. STAT. § 11A.24 (Supp. 1981); OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 3309.15 (Page
Supp. 1981). Many other states place similar restrictions on fund investments.
See PENSiON TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 194.
102. See MIm. STAT. § 11A.24 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.15
(Page Supp. 1981).
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tially increased the percentage of assets that can be invested in
common stocks.103 Notwithstanding these changes, some in-
vestments are still not available to these boards. Moreover, the
boards themselves have restricted further their own invest-
ment flexibility.04 Mandated investment restrictions, from
whatever source, produce inherent inefficiencies in portfolio
management and poor investment results.105 Investment re-
strictions also hinder effective evaluation of management per-
formance by allowing managers to use restrictions as an
explanation or excuse for disappointing performance. 06
Although a recent series of events in Minnesota formed a
catalyst for inquiry and changes relating to SBI operations, 0 7 it
103. See MIN. STAT. § 11A.24(5) (Supp. 1981).
104. For example, the SBI prohibits investments in tobacco and liquor as
well as in certain infant formulas. Interview with Roger Henry, Equity Invest-
ment Manager of the Minnesota State Board of Investment, in St. Paul, Minn.
(Aug. 11, 1981); interview with Lawrence A. Martin, supra note 83.
105. After discussing forms of investment restrictions, the Pension Task
Force Report reached the following conclusion:
Clearly the various investment restrictions confronting public em-
ployee retirement systems hinder the efficiency of the total portfolio
management of such plans. In fact, nearly one-fourth of the large state
and local public pension plans responding to the ... survey indicated
that such restrictions impaired pension fund investment performance
over the past five years.
PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 197. See also R. TInvE, supra
note 6, at 203. The State Auditor of Minnesota notes that investment "con-
straipts may now have a 'cost' exceeding any benefit-a cost of lost opportunity
for SBI. If it were not prohibited by law, SBI could invest its money in other
areas and obtain greater returns." OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDIToR, REPORT OF
THE STATE AUDITOR OF MINNESOTA, SPECIAL REPORT ON STATE BOARD OF IN-
VESTMENT, at 45 (Oct. 27, 1980). See also Gilkison, Investment Approaches for
Employee Pension Plans, 1977 PuB. EMPLOYEES CONF. PROC. 123, 129.
106. Interview with Arne H. Carlson, supra note 88.
107. Among these events were a change in the SBI membership, a new ex-
ecutive director in 1979 who resigned in late 1981 under sharp criticism from
one board member, the formal establishment of the IAC in 1980, persistent
questions by one board member and others outside the board, public criticism
of the system's fund performance, and the filing of a lawsuit in mid-1981 by one
of the state retirement systems charging the SBI with breach of its fiduciary
responsibilities through its alleged failure to discharge actively its duties.
Trustees of the Minn. Pub. Employees Retirement Ass'n v. Minnesota State Bd.
of Inv., No. 452938 (Minn. Dist. Ct. filed Aug., 1981, dismissed Jan. 22, 1982). See
infra note 202. Discernible changes in SBI operations include a staff reorgani-
zation by the most recent executive director, the establishment of an executive
committee to focus on policy issues, the adoption by the SBI of the IAC's writ-
ten recommendations on investment objectives and asset mixes for each fund
managed by the SBI, a gradual move toward greater interaction between the
SBI and the IAC, direct reporting to the SBI by the outside consultant on com-
parative performance findings, and the passage of statutory amendments ex-
panding the SBrs investment authority. See PMM PART I REPORT, supra note
78, at 3, 5, 8, 1-2-3, 1-5, 1-14-15, IV-3, IV-5-7, IV-8; PMM PART HI REPORT, supra note
76, at 9-11, 14-18; Young, A Capital Fight, 12 CoRP. REP. MINN. 69 (1981); The
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is clear that significant problems exist in the following areas:
policy formulation; the delineation of powers and duties among
the SBI, its executive director and staff, and the TAC; adequate
communication and reporting among these bodies; the estab-
lishment of appropriate performance measurements; and for-
mal evaluation procedures of the executive director and staff
by the SBI. Most of the key issues in these areas are as yet un-
resolved. They are the subject of intense study and heated de-
bate in what is often an adversarial atmosphere. Modification
and change clearly are needed to insure better efficiency in the
management of the retirement funds entrusted to the Minne-
sota SBI and other state retirement boards operating with simi-
lar problems and inefficiencies.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. LIMITATIONS
Proposed changes or modifications in the structure and op-
eration of existing public retirement systems must be made in
the context of three fundamental limitations. First, a theoreti-
cally perfect regulatory framework for retirement systems can-
not cure existing problems that are not attributable to
structural and operational deficiencies. Organizational changes
will not make a poor manager or fiduciary a good one. The ef-
fectiveness of any system depends on the competence, integ-
rity, and commitment of the individuals responsible for its
operation.108 The importance of the regulatory framework in
which individuals operate should not be underestimated, how-
ever. The allocation of powers and duties, the definition of job
functions, the communication of performance standards, the
formalization of evaluations, and the response to both good and
bad performance can affect the abilities and motivations of an
organization's individuals to perform efficiently.109 The role of
the regulatory legal framework is to create those conditions
Challenge for State Investment Policy, Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 30, 1981, at
12A, col. 1; Carlson, White Trade Insults at Investment Board Meeting, Minne-
apolis Tribune, Aug. 28, 1981, at 3B, col. 1; State's Investment Director Resigns,
Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 25, 1981, at liB, col. 5.
108. One scholar analyzes the economic activities of organizations based on
a set of propositions including the fact that "the results of organizational be-
havior depend on the behavior of its individual members" and the fact that "in-
dividual performance depends on the specific effort choices of the individuals
involved." H. LEIBENSTEIN, GENERAL X-EFICIENCY THEORY Aim EcoNoMIc DE-
VELOPmENT 157 (1978).
109. Id. "A basic question rarely considered by development economists
deals with the relationship between the organizational structure of the econ-
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that will insure competent and honest personnel and, just as
significantly, that will enable and encourage such individuals to
perform efficiently.
The second limitation on proposing changes is the reality
of the political environment in which public retirement systems
operate and in which proposed changes must be made.110 Many
state retirement systems are large organizations with long his-
tories of well entrenched attitudes, practices, and customs. The
control of such large and well established organizations is also
a source of political power. This does not mean, however, that
a discussion of alternatives to existing regulation is an exercise
in futility. Scholarship that points out the weaknesses of an
existing structure and demonstrates the superiority of an alter-
native approach can help build or strengthen a constituency for
the adoption of change. At the very least such scholarship can
give politicians a publicly defensible alternative when under
pressure from critics of the status quo."' To be realistic, how-
ever, any proposal must be politically feasible. Thus, "the real
choices are often among alternative imperfect forms of con-
trol" 112 rather than between existing regulation and some ideal
state. The following proposal recognizes that government con-
trol of public retirement systems is a political reality whether
or not it is an ideal state.
Finally, this proposal is made in the context of a paucity of
literature on the subject and a limited number of case stud-
ies1 3 A theory of legal structure cannot be proved at this
stage. Therefore, the results of the actual utilization of these
ideas are needed in order to judge the merit of this particular
proposal. This proposal is offered in concrete and prescriptive
terms in the hope of stimulating needed further study and con-
structive debate over the issue of public retirement system reg-
ulation and management.
The first part of the proposal recommends specific statu-
tory duties that should be imposed on the board and actions
that the board should take in compliance with these duties to
insure a governance process aimed at fulfilling the control ob-
omy and the motivating factors that influence organizational behavior." Id. at
156.
110. See T. BLEAiNy, supra note 7, at 8-9, 13. See also R SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 41, at 2.
111. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 41, at 2.
112. Id.
113. The author is unaware of any public retirement system that uses all
the ideas presented in this Article.
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jective of portfolio selection efficiency. The second part of the
proposal focuses on appropriate statutory standards for board
membership, structure, and accountability that will minimize
bureaucratic error and administrative cost.
B. GOVERNANCE PROCESS
A public pension statute" 4 should clearly identify portfolio
efficiency as the control objective of the retirement board." 5
Governing public retirement systems for portfolio efficiency re-
quires: 1) formulation of policies and performance guidelines
for plan fund management; 2) management autonomy in imple-
menting these policies and guidelines; and 3) incentives and
pressures to encourage successful performance by those placed
in control of the pension system. The corporate model com-
monly used to govern public employee retirement systems fur-
nishes a logical structure for allocating functions between the
policy-making retirement board and the policy-implementing
investment manager, whether internal or external.
1. Policy Formulation
Since the proper objective of fund regulation is the max-
imization of financial return within a given level of risk, the pri-
mary policy issue facing the board is the appropriate level of
risk to accept when investing fund assets. Risk policy formula-
tion involves three steps: 1) the consideration of the fund's and
sponsor's financial characteristics and external limitations;
2) the projections of such factors and the analyses of alterna-
tive investment policies; and 3) the translation of investment
policy into operating objectives.
Step one includes consideration of fund characteristics
such as fund size, the promised benefit scales, the employer
and the employee contribution rates, the liquidity demands
placed on the fund by retirees, the costs to operate the fund,
and actuarial assumptions regarding investment return rates,
114. '"The single most critical control point is the law, decree, or other basic
authority providing for the creation of a public enterprise. The nature of this
action is likely to determine in large measure all other organizational relation-
ships." Seidman, The Government Corporation: Organization and Controls, 14
PuB. AD. REV. 183, 185 (1954).
115. The purpose of Minnesota's public pension investment statute "is to
establish standards which will insure that state and pension assets subject to
this legislation will be responsibly invested to maximize the total rate of return
without incurring undue risk." MmNN. STAT. § IlA.01 (1980). Ohio has no com-
parable provision.
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employee turnover, age profiles, life expectancies and salary in-
creases. 116 The capability of the plan sponsor to fulfill its prom-
ise of providing retirees with the specified benefit payments in
the event that fund assets and investment returns prove to be
an inadequate source is also a factor that bears on a fund's ap-
propriate level of risk, even when the plan sponsor is the gov-
ernment. Default by the government has become a greater
possibility with an increased ratio of public employees to non-
public employees, increased government borrowing, and the
potential for taxpayer revolts.117 Thus, when determining a
risk level for a pension fund, the retirement board should con-
sider the ratio of government contributions to total government
revenues and trends in this ratio measured against historical
experience." 8 The board should also consider government rev-
enues in relation to the plan's unfunded vested liability and the
impact of inflation on government revenues.1 1 9 Finally, the
board must consider such external factors as the current posi-
tion of capital markets, the legal limitations on its investment
power, and statutory restraints on budgetary, payroll and per-
sonnel policy.120
After considering the relevant internal and external charac-
teristics of the fund and its sponsor, the second step in the pol-
icy formulation process is to make projections of these
characteristics and to determine how alternative investment
policies will affect these characteristics.121 The long-term effect
of a particular investment policy on the two key ratios of contri-
butions as a percentage of payroll and plan assets as a percent-
age of plan liabilities may require re-evaluation of the plan's
ability to accept risk.122 Thus, it is important that the board
make and analyze its projections on a long-term as well as a
short-term basis. Such projections and analyses enable the
board to define income, asset value, and liquidity requirements.
This process also enables the board to make informed choices
116. See, e.g., Levy, How to Resolve that Critical Asset Mix Problem, PEN-
SION WoRLD, Aug. 1978, at 58, 60.
117. See, e.g., A. WmLLAMs III, supra note 100, at 36-37. See generally PEN-
SION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 95-99.
118. A. WILIAMs HI, supra note 100, at 37.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Stiteler, Misuse of Actuarially Assumed Interest Rates in De-
termining Pension Investment Policy, PENSION WORIM, May 1981, at 22, 26.
121. See, e.g., Grossman, Developing Investment Policy and Statement PEN-
SION WORLD, Dec. 1981, at 46-47.
122. Id. at 47.
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among risk tolerance levels and investment management
styles.
Once the board has selected an investment policy, the final
step is to translate it into clear and consistent operating objec-
tives.123 Operating objectives provide concrete direction to the
investment manager, reducing the likelihood of "management
by crisis,"' 24 and give the board a concrete standard against
which to evaluate the manager's performance. Without objec-
tives, evaluation either will not occur or will be made on the ba-
sis of obvious minimum standards.125 Thus, the board's
investment policies must be translated into return objectives,
asset mix and investment media maximums, and risk tolerance
levels.126
The importance of this policy formulation process cannot
be overestimated. Formulating policy and translating it into
operating objectives affects the board's ability to fulfill its con-
trol objective.127 The process assists the board in planning for
the future by forcing it to evaluate existing and projected fund
assets and liabilities. This evaluation in turn enables the board
to analyze and choose among alternative investment ap-
proaches. Operating objectives help direct management devel-
opment by identifying objectives of individuals with objectives
of the system, by making the objectives specific, and by creat-
ing a means of measuring the success of individuals in meeting
their specified objectives. Planning for the future, analyzing
and choosing among alternative courses of action, and develop-
ing the potential abilities of the individuals charged with daily
operations increase effectiveness and efficiency in the use of
the system's funds.
In order to engage successfully in the policy formulation
process, the board needs resources to collect, project, analyze,
and comprehend relevant data relating to investments, eco-
nomics, finances, actuarial science, accounting, and statistics.128
Furthermore, such activities require a board whose members
123. An operating objective is an unambiguous statement of policy "that di-
rectly guides management action but allows for management expertise to
choose the operational strategy to reach the objective." N. HAMILTON & P. HAM-
mTON, supra note 19, at 9. See also Granger, The Hierarchy of Objectives, HARv.
Bus. REv., May-June 1964, at 63, 66.
124. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMITON, supra note 19, at 97-98.
125. Id. at 9, 99.
126. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 121, at 48.
127. Practical uses of objectives are identified and discussed in Granger,
supra note 123, at 71-74.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91.
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are familiar with these subjects and who are willing and able to
commit the time and energy necessary to fulfill board duties.129
Finally, the board needs to be accountable for the degree to
which, and the manner in which, it successfully fulfills its con-
trol objective of portfolio efficiency.130
2. Policy Implementation
Under the corporate model, policy implementation is the
responsibility of an investment manager selected by the board.
It is essential that the board carefully select its manager, give
the manager the authority and autonomy to operate the plan
on a day to day basis, and maintain open and effective lines of
communication with the manager.
One of the most important tasks facing the board is the se-
lection of an investment manager who will implement board
policies.' 3 ' Before selecting a manager, the board must decide
whether to use internal or external management, how many in-
vestment managers to use, whether to use special or general
managers, and what management style is appropriate for fulfil-
ling the board's policies.132 Decisions on these management
structure issues will enable the board to establish selection cri-
teria and create a master candidate list from which to choose
the investment manager(s).133
In evaluating specific candidates, the board should inquire
into the manager's work load, philosophy and performance his-
tory, and determine how he or she proposes to handle the tran-
sition from the existing portfolio to the final portfolio reflecting
the investment choices of the manager and the board.134 The
board must ascertain the extent to which the manager is con-
versant with current theories and techniques found in the
respected body of financial microeconomic literature. The
129. See infra text accompanying notes 178-87.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 192-205.
131. "[T]his responsibility entails choosing someone to manage millions-
sometimes billions-of dollars and to make investment decisions which will af-
fect the future of countless employees." Michaelis, Five Questions to Ask Pro-
spective Money Managers, PENSION WoRLD, Apr. 1979, at 24.
132. See, e.g., A. WmLmAIms II, supra note 100, at 71-116; Haight, Investment
Management-Internal or External? PENSION WoRLD, Nov. 1980, at 20; Minard,
Time to Re-Examine, PENSION WORLD, July 1980, at 14, 15-16; Vaughan, Perspec-
tive on the 1980's, PENSION WoRLI, Aug. 1980, at 24.
133. See, e.g., Chittim & Yanni, Money Manager Selection: The Business De-
cision, PENSION WoRLD, Feb. 1980, at 17, 18.
134. See, e.g., A. WmIAms MI, supra note 100, at 104-16; Chittim & Yanni,
supra note 133, at 19; Michaelis, supra note 131, at 30-31; Minard, supra note
132, at 16-17.
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board should investigate the manager's existing, in the case of
external management firms, or proposed, in the case of internal
managers, internal organizational structure. The board needs
to know how the manager gathers and uses information, makes
investment decisions, and employs incentive compensation sys-
tems for personnel. The board should investigate the man-
ager's staff and resource capabilities and internal review
procedures. 3 5 Finally, the board must evaluate the chemistry
between the board and the manager. The manager must be
one in whom the board can place its trust, who is accessible
and attentive to fund matters, and with whom the board can
communicate effectively.136
The board should give the investment manager broad
power and autonomy to manage the fund within the scope of
the board's operating objectives. Creating and executing the
investment strategies most effective in fulfilling operating
objectives require both full-time work and a thorough knowl-
edge and understanding of the investment management busi-
ness.1 3 7 This includes a working knowledge of capital markets,
financial statistics, information resources, theories, and tech-
niques. Because the investment manager is more likely to have
the time and knowledge, he or she presumably is in a better po-
sition than the board to make productive use of plan funds in
the pursuit of the system's control objective of portfolio
efficiency.
Investment constraints, in whatever form, ultimately lead
to waste and lost opportunities.138 For example, many systems
impose screening procedures requiring the manager to present,
justify, and obtain board approval for investment decisions
before they are executed. Such a procedure severely hampers
the manager's ability to respond quickly to market changes and
to make a continuing and consistent succession of investment
decisions.L3 9 Even where the manager is authorized to take ac-
135. See, e.g., A. WILLIAMS III, supra note 100; Chittim & Yanni, supra note
133; Michaelis, supra note 131; Minard, supra note 132.
136. See, e.g., Chittim & Yanni, supra note 133, at 20; Hydrick, Is George Pat-
ton Going to Manage Your Money?, PENSION WORLD, June 1981, at 48, 81;
Michaelis, supra note 131, at 32.
137. For a discussion of the advantages of management autonomy in the
area of public transit, see N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 100.
138. See supra note 105.
139. See, e.g., IL TmovE, supra note 6, at 212; Michaelis, supra note 131, at
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.15 (Page Supp. 1981) provides that "[n]o in-
vestment shall be made... without prior approval by the... board." Ohio's
SERS board provides its investment officer with an approved list of stock in-
vestments. Interview with Thomas L Anderson, supra note 69.
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tion under exigent circumstances, many systems require sub-
sequent board ratification.140 The need to justify individual
decisions and the risk of board disapproval can inhibit the
manager's willingness to act.
Similarly, board investment lists, prohibitions, or mandates
impede investnfent flexibility.141 A board prohibition against
investments in venture capital firms because they are "too
risky" offers an example of unwarranted board interference in
decisions more appropriately left to management. At first
blush, venture capital firms, in terms of total risk, may appear
to be "too risky." Since diversification can virtually eliminate
firm specific risk,142 however, the relevant issue is the level of
systematic risk143 of a venture capital firm. The systematic risk
of a venture capital firm may well match the risk preference of
a particular state pension fund. Venture capital firms, there-
fore, should be part of the universe of investments available to
the fund manager.
Recent financial literature indicates that in order to maxi-
mize wealth, a tax-exempt investor should invest in securities
with the greatest difference between pre-tax and post-tax re-
turns without disruption of the match between the securities'
risk and the investor's risk preference.144 Since the return on
debt is more heavily taxed than the return on equity,14 5 the is-
suer of debt must offer a greater rate of return relative to sys-
140. The investment officer of the Ohio SERS is authorized to sell stock
upon the recommendation of the board's investment counsel if there is a risk of
decline in the stock's market value or a risk of financial impairment of the com-
pany issuing the stock. The investment officer must first inform the investment
committee of the board, however, if such a sale would result in a loss to the
fund. Interview with Thomas R. Anderson, supra note 69.
141. See, e.g., Gilkison, supra note 105, at 128-29. For a discussion of the po-
tential underdiversification resulting from investment restrictions, see supra
notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 26.
143. See id.
144. Black & Dewhurst, A New Investment Strategy for Pension Funds, 7 J.
PORTFOLIO MGmT. 26 (1981).
145. If a corporation accumulates its earnings rather than distributes them
to its shareholders, its stock will appreciate in value and the appreciation will
be taxed at capital gain rates upon the sale of the stock. In contrast, distrib-
uted corporate earnings are taxed as dividend income at ordinary income rates.
The only return received on a debt investment, however, is the interest earned
on the obligation owed by the corporation which is taxed like dividend income
at ordinary income rates.
An equity investment in a mutual fund company receives even more
favorable tax treatment, since it entities the shareholders to receive dividends
on a capital gains basis to the extent of the shareholders' portion of the capital
gains earned at the corporate level
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tematic risk than the issuer of equity. Earnings from pension
fund investments are not taxed. Thus, tax-exempt investors,
such as pension funds, can capture this excess pre-tax return
by investing in debt rather than equity.146 Under these circum-
stances, failure to invest in debt means the investor is not max-
imizing wealth. The validity of such a theory, however, does
not justify a statutory or board prohibition of equity invest-
ments. Circumstances could change making it appropriate for
pension funds to invest in equity. The universe of investment
vehicles, therefore, should be available to afford the manager
the flexibility to use valid financial theories as they develop and
as circumstances warrant. The only appropriate constraint on
the investment manager is one of rationality in pursuing maxi-
mum return at an appropriate risk level.
The successful implementation of board policy depends not
only on the competence and autonomy of the management but
also on the nature of the communications between the board
and management. Management obviously must know the na-
ture of its responsibilities and the extent of its discretion and
authority in fulfilling those responsibilities. Without such
knowledge, management operates in a vacuum with little or no
direction. Thus, it is essential that the board clearly communi-
cate its policies and objectives in writing to management. In
addition, continuing and open communication with the board
about management's strategies, studies, procedures, and inter-
nal evaluations enables the board to monitor and evaluate the
performance of management. 147 It also gives management an
opportunity to provide the board with financial and investment
data, an appraisal of the feasibility of proposed objectives, and
suggestions regarding available investment alternatives. 14 8 Fi-
146. The following example, although extreme in its assumptions, illustrates
the point. Suppose an equity investment has a risk level of 2 and an expected
return of $100 that is not taxed, and the return on a debt investment with a risk
level of 1 is subject to a 50% tax rate. Suppose also that, because the debt is
half as risky as the equity, the debt would have to offer half the return, or $50, if
it were not taxed. But since it is taxed, the post-tax return on the debt is only
$25. The debt issuer, in order to compensate for this tax effect, must offer taxed
investors a pre-tax return of $100, thus making the post-tax return one-half of
the equity's expected return in accordance with the respective systematic risk
levels of each investment. The tax-exempt investor can capture a $100 return
through the debt investment and incur only half the risk of the equity invest-
ment offering the same expected return. Investing in the debt under such cir-
cumstances obviously maximizes wealth for the tax-exempt investor.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 86-107; A. Wn2AMs III, supra note
100, at 219, 221-24. See, e.g., PMM PART II REPoRT, supra note 76, at 8, 12, 14, 31-
32, 35-38.
148. See generally A. WILLAMs III, supra note 100, at 219, 221-24.
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nally, regular channels of communication help prevent misun-
derstandings and distrust between the board and management.
It is only in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect
that the control and operation of the system will be a coopera-




Providing an investment manager with operating objectives
and the autonomy and authority needed to fulfill those objec-
tives does not ensure portfolio efficiency. Competition is a nec-
essary condition for the production of goods at the lowest
cost.'5 0 It fosters the development and adoption of the most ef-
fective methods of production.151 In the private sector, compe-
tition automatically roots out inefficient producers through
their inability to maintain adequate profit levels. In the public
sector, on the other hand, production efficiency' 52 is primarily
achieved by evaluating production processes through perform-
ance measurements. 5 3
There are two basic ways to introduce competition into the
management of public employee retirement funds. One is in-
terfund competition through performance comparisons among
149. See, e.g., Gilldson, supra note 105, at 128. In the words of two authors:
[L]ike a marriage, it will take time to get to know, understand and
trust one another. Open communication and patience is essential in
any good marriage, particularly one between a [board] and its pension
fund money manager. If there's any single point we would emphasize
in this paper, it is "Don't stop talking to each other."
Chittim & Yanni, supra note 133, at 20.
150. For a discussion of the process called "economic darwinism" whereby
goods are produced at the lowest cost through "natural selection" in the free
market, see N. HAMLTON & P. HAmILTON, supra note 19, at 50-52, 101.
151. See generally A. WmLiAMs III supra note 100, at 225-26.
152. Production efficiency in pension funds translates into investments
which realize specified returns at the lowest possible risk or, alternatively, real-
ize the highest return possible at a specified level of risk.
153. Tilove notes that-
In government systems [the] direct profit motive does not exist. If
investment yield is superior, it is not generally clear who will profit:
the public employer (by way of an abatement of contributions), or the
employees (perhaps because the extra yield is credited to employee-
contribution accounts, or because any extra margin is often considered
an appropriate basis for benefit improvements). In any case, no one
party is as strongly motivated as the corporate executive to improve in-
vestment yield.
1& TaovE, supra note 6, at 215. Thus, the board must measure and evaluate
management performance and implement appropriate responses to inefficient
management. See infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
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existing systems. 5 4 The obvious difficulty in making such com-
parisons, however, is that all public employee retirement fund
managers do not operate under the same conditions. Variables
such as fund size, operating objectives, investment constraints,
and research and staff support can have a significant impact on
investment returns independent of the capabilities and efforts
of management. 5 5
A second method of introducing competitive pressure into
retirement fund management is to use multiple investment
managers, each of whom is in charge of an equal portion of the
fund and has the same operating objectives.156 Investment
managers whose jobs or salaries depend on producing higher
returns than each other without going outside the board's in-
vestment guidelines will have a natural incentive to devise the
most efficient portfolio. 5 7 In addition, the board will be better
able to evaluate different management investment approaches
by comparing investment results, and thus will be able to elimi-
nate inefficient management. Multiple managers also can be
used in systems that directly employ inside management.
Each manager, however, will want his or her own staff, since
the staff is an important variable in the manager's ability to
perform efficiently and to fulfill operating objectives. The cost
of employing more than one manager each with his or her own
staff is likely to exceed what private investment firms would
charge for the same fund management services.158 Moreover,
government finds it difficult to attract and retain competent
managers because of the pressures and vagaries of the political
154. For a discussion of various comparative services available, see Derven,
Essential Aids In Keeping Pension Funds on Targe PENSION WORLD, Aug.
1981, at 45. See also A. WLL=AMs III, supra note 100, at 213. Self-imposed com-
petition can result from a desire to do better than managers of other public
funds both within and outside the state. Interview with Thomas R. Anderson,
supra note 69.
155. See, e.g., Levy, Common Sense and Comparative Performance, PENSION
WORLD, Apr. 1978, at 8. One of the current controversies between the Minne-
sota SBI and investment staff is the proper universe to use when comparing in-
vestment performances. Interview with Arne H. Carlson, supra note 88;
Interview with Roger Henry, supra note 104; Interview with Lawrence A. Mar-
tin, supra note 83.
156. It should be noted that multiple managers are used for specialization
purposes as well as for diversification reasons. That is, "sponsors have come to
feel that they are unlikely to find the best bond manager and the best stock
manager within the same firm, so they seek organizations which specialize in
one asset category or another." A. WILLIAMs I, supra note 100, at 225.
157. More graphically stated: 'The sheer threat of losing to a better man-
ager will serve as a blowtorch on the behind of the manager." Gilkison, supra
note 105, at 127-28.
158. See, e.g., A. WLLuMs III, supra note 100, at 225.
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arena in which management must operate. 15 9 Managers find the
public sector less attractive because of the government's inabil-
ity or unwillingness to offer salaries and incentive-compensa-
tion packages competitive with private investment
management firms.16 0
Alternatively, the board can attempt to put competitive
pressure on inside management by hiring a private firm to
manage a portion of the fund's assets. The same problems as-
sociated with internal management will exist, however, and un-
less inside management is given similar staff, research support,
and compensation incentives, fair performance comparisons
will be difficult to make.
The solution to the problems of internal management is to
use private investment management firms exclusively. The
board could contract out the management of all fund assets to
two or more private firms which would compete between or
among themselves. It may be more difficult and costly, how-
ever, for the board to hire and monitor the performances of
multiple outside managers than it would be to hire and monitor
a single firm.161 In such a case, a more effective means of intro-
ducing competition may be to have contract management firms
bid for the opportunity to manage the fund for a prescribed
term.162 The board could present prospective managers with
relevant fund data and board objectives and have them com-
pete for the contract by submitting bids detailing their fees, in-
vestment style, proposed strategies, and return/risk
projections. 163
159. See, e.g., N. HAMLTON & P. HAmmTON, supra note 19, at 107.
160. There is considerable scholarly opinion to support the proposition that
a sense of public duty is an insufficient motivator. For example, Bergson, Man-
agerial Risks and Rewards in Public Enterprises, 2 J. OF Comp. ECON. 211, 215
(1978) states, "[M]anagers are only interested in their own expected utilities,
and must be induced to maximize expected benefit to the community by penal-
ties and rewards which depend on the benefit produced." In the words of an-
other scholar, "Individuals in the bureaucracy, like the rest of us, do react to
different incentive schemes.... They prefer more rather than less income,
power, prestige, pleasant surroundings, and congenial employees.... ." Davies,
Foreward to BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: TuE SOURCES OF GOVERNmENT
GROWTH at xi-xii (T. Borcherding ed. 1977). See also Dornstein, Managerial
Theories, Social Responsibility and Goal Orientations of Top Level Manage-
ment in State-Owned Enterprise, 5 J. OF BEHAV. ECON. 65, 81, 85 (1977). Com-
pensation packages adequate to attract and keep the best investment
professionals from the private sector require salaries exceeding those of most
states' highest elected officials. Providing such compensation, however, is polit-
ically impossible.
161. See supra note 151.
162. See generally N. HAMMTON & P. HAmITON, supra note 19, at 105-09.
163. The lowest bid for management fees may have little relation to the
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With the exclusive use of outside management, inside man-
agement would be eliminated or transformed into a consulting
body.16 4 This body could be helpful in the areas of investment
policy formulation, management selection, monitoring, and
evaluation. It could be responsible for collecting and analyzing
relevant data, testing alternative investment policies, recom-
mending operating objectives and performance measurements,
and performing any special studies requested by the board.
b. Review Procedures
Competitive pressures on management need to be comple-
mented by a system of review procedures to identify inefficient
management. A thorough review process requires meeting pe-
riodically with management, establishing performance mea-
surements, evaluating management performance, and
establishing and carrying out responses to inadequate perform-
ance. 165 Periodic face to face meetings between the board and
manager force the manager to articulate the investment strat-
egy being used, the reasons for its use, and plans for future
strategies. These meetings also provide the manager with the
opportunity to explain to the board the impact of market activi-
ties on the prospects of meeting investment objectives. This in-
formation helps the board review its own policies and
objectives as well as evaluate the adequacy of the manager's
performance. If such meetings occur too often, however, they
can cause the board to focus on short-term performance and in-
advertently involve the board in management activities.166 Fur-
ability of the bidder to produce the highest return. The board obviously will
have to look to the qualifications of the bidders and the reasonableness of each
of the bids' assumptions and projections to eliminate the "adventurous" bid.
The non-fulfillment of performance projections should be taken into account
during the board's periodic evaluations of management. See infra text accom-
panying notes 165-74. In addition, minimum performance guarantees can bet re-
quired. Some funds use such financial incentives whereby a manager receives
a bonus if he outperforms a specific index and refunds a portion of his fee if he
underperforms. See OFFICE OF THE STATE AuDrroR, supra note 105, at 40.
164. See generally Levy, The Independent Pension Consultant: What Can He
Do For Your Fundl PENSION WORLD, Nov. 1978, at 41.
165. See, e.g., A. WILLIAMS I, supra note 100, at 212-24.
166. Id. at 213-15. See also Gilkison, supra note 105, at 128. Although bi-an-
nual or quarterly meetings may be held, the focus of such meetings should be
information exchange, not formal evaluation. Generally, the formal evaluation
should be made after completion of a market cycle. Id. Accord Interview with
Amne H. Carlson, supra note 88. Another commentator has noted the value of
foregoing impromptu evaluations:
Clearly, sponsors should allow their managers to demonstrate their
skills both when their style is "in favor" and when not in favor. To hire
a manager after his type of holdings have done well and perhaps
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
thermore, preparation for frequent meetings prevents the
manager from focusing on the daily details of managing the
fund and prevents the board from focusing on policy issues.
These meetings, therefore, should not be held too frequently
and should be conducted only for the purpose of communicat-
ing information, such as economic outlooks, interest rate pre-
dictions, stock market prognoses, and recent past events in
these areas, that will be useful to policy formulation and per-
formance evaluation.
Effective board review requires the adoption of quantifiable
performance measurements. 167 The absence of objective stan-
dards to measure the relative degree of management's attain-
ment of operating objectives leads to subjective evaluation. A
lack of standards also encourages a manager to exert only the
minimal degree of effort he or she believes will satisfy a
review.168
The board should judge management performance in terms
of the board's operating objectives and comparative perform-
ance data. These dual forms of measurement enable the board
to assess the significance of a manager's failure or success in
fulfilling objectives.169 For example, the failure to achieve board
objectives by a manager who outperforms other managers with
whom he or she is being compared 7 could be attributable to
unpredictable swings in the market beyond the manager's con-
trol. The failure, however, could be attributable to the adoption
of infeasible policies and objectives or to the board's inade-
quate communication of its policies and objectives to the man-
ager. In other words, a thorough evaluation of management
performance goes beyond performance measurements. It re-
quires the board to explore the reasons behind the perform-
peaked, only to fire him in the next stage of the cycle when his securi-
ties have done poorly, demonstrates precipitous and irrational behav-
ior. Sponsors can be whipsawed when, having dismissed a manager
whose style was out of favor, the stocks rebound with the market, and
the sponsor has missed the boat twice.
Minard, supra note 132, at 18.
167. Numerous measurement techniques are available, including various
market indices and performance comparison services. The 1975 Securities Act
Amendments made available new performance data on investment advisors
that a retirement plan board should find useful in comparing the performance
of its management to that of other investment managers. See Levy, Investment
Advisors Performance: A Secret No More, PENSION WoRmD, Aug. 1979, at 22. See
also A. W=uAms MI, supra note 100, at 117-40; Derven, supra note 154, at 45.
168. See supra note 99.
169. See, e.g., A. WLnuAms III, supra note 100, at 213, 215-16.
170. The converse, of course, can exist. That is, the manager may fulfill
board objectives but underperform other comparable managers. Id. at 216.
[Vol. 67:211
1982] PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 251
ance statistics. The board, therefore, should 1) view the
manager's activities in terms of the manager's stated strategy
to achieve board objectives and professed style of management;
2) monitor changes in the manager's internal structure, poli-
cies, and execution capabilities; 3) review the manager's will-
ingness and ability to communicate with the board; and
4) establish the levels of underperformance that the fund can
tolerate.171
After the evaluation of all these aspects of the manager's
performance, the board must respond appropriately.172 The ap-
propriate response to mediocre or unsatisfactory performance
can range from a review and revision of the board's own poli-
cies, objectives, and communication procedures to forcing the
manager to take corrective action to replacing the manager.
The board should also respond to superior performance. Ap-
propriate responses here might include contract renewals, in-
creased fees, and public statements of commendation. 7 3 By
imposing the pressure of competition on management, thor-
oughly evaluating management performance, and making man-
agement directly bear the consequences of its abilities and
efforts, the board can come as close as possible to ensuring the
fulfillment of its policies and objectives in furtherance of its
own control objective.174
4. Statutory Mandates
To insure the creation of conditions necessary for portfolio
efficiency, the statute should empower and direct the board to
do the following- 1) formulate investment policies based on
171. Id. at 221-24. See also Minard, supra note 132, at 17.
172. For a discussion of how to establish appropriate responses, see A. Wir-
LiAIAs Il, supra note 100, at 217-21. The response will be affected in part by the
ranges of underperformance the fund can tolerate. Thus, the board must estab-
lish allowable tolerances for underperformance in order to define an appropri-
ate response. Id at 213, 215. Furthermore, because replacing a manager "can
be an expensive and fruitless process ... it is helpful to consider ways in
which... difficulties can be corrected while still retaining the manager." Id at
220.
173. For a discussion of financial rewards and punishments, see supra note
163.
174. See generally H. LEBENSTEIN, supra note 108, at 163-71 for a discussion
of X-efficiency variables, i.e., an organization's structural, environmental, and
procedural characteristics which affect its economic efficiencies. These vari-
ables are identified as (1) the extent to which an individual is made to bear the
consequences of his activities; (2) pressure from authorities and peers; (3) cost
constraints, including (a) standards of performance, (b) maximum revenue
available to an organization, (c) the degree of competition, and (d) the degree
of bureaucratic control and (4) individual effort. Id
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short and long-term projections and analyses; 2) produce a
written statement of policies; 3) adopt a clear statement of op-
erating objectives consistent with board policies; 4) develop ap-
propriate methods for measuring the performance of operating
objectives;175 5) select qualified investment management; 7 6
6) create competitive pressure for management; and 7) estab-
lish and implement periodic management performance review
procedures.
C. GOVERNING BOARD
Even with such statutory directives, the board can make
mistakes through statutory misconstructions, incompetence,
and the use of inaccurate or insufficient information. A statute
cannot eliminate the misjudgments of those responsible for its
implementation, but it can reduce the likelihood of bureau-
cratic error and administrative cost.177 The standards it de-
mands of administrators determine in large measure the
success with which the pension system will achieve its
objective.
1. Board Members
If a pension act is to reduce administrative error, it must
require board members to be qualified, independent, and free
to devote time and energy to their board duties. A basic under-
standing of statistics, accounting, economics, finance, invest-
ment theories, and business management, acquired through
education or experience, should be required of all board mem-
bers. The board should be large enough to ensure diversifica-
tion of skills and experiences in order to promote board
175. MINN. STAT. § 11A.04(11) (1980) directs the SBI to "[e]stablish a
formula or formulas to measure management performance and return on in-
vestment. All public pension funds in the state shall utilize the formula or for-
mulas developed by the state board." One interviewee cited this provision as
an example of the fact that things are not always run as the statute provides.
Interview with Lawrence A. Martin, supra note 83. Furthermore, this provision
apparently has been construed as not requiring funds to calculate and report
investment returns, but only requiring that such calculations, if done at all, be
done according to the established formula.
176. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
177. "It is a reasonable assumption that legal structure and the minimiza-
tion of error in policy determination and production are inextricably linked,
since it is the structure of the board which in large part defines the information
available, the competence and motivation of the board, and the decision-mak-
ing procedure." N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 114. See gener-
ally H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 108, at 156-80 (organizational factors in
production efficiency).
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competence. A multi-member board will bring different points
of view and experiences to board deliberations, thereby dis-
couraging arbitrary and capricious board action. 7 8
Board members also should be independent. That is, they
should be free of any conflicting interests 7 9 or undue vulnera-
bility to political pressures.180 Statutory provisions can help
ensure board independence by requiring potential and current
board members to disclose their financial investments, sources
of income, and business and family relationships. Although the
board is not responsible for individual investment decisions,
employment or substantial interests in a particular industry or
investment medium have the potential for influencing a mem-
ber's investment policy decisions. Similarly, a business or fam-
ily relationship to any individual or firm under consideration by
the board for employment or a contract award can bias a board
member. Board members should be required to withdraw from
any board deliberations regarding a matter that involves poten-
tial conflict.181
To avoid political pressure on board members, which can
deprive them of independent judgment, members should be
nonelected officials with fixed terms of office.' 82 Elected offi-
cials are subject to strong interest group lobbying and are af-
fected by the need or desire to gain support of key groups of
voters. Such influences increase the possibility of decisionmak-
ing errors. Fixed terms for board membership can foster board
independence from organized interest groups.
Additionally, the statute can further board independence
178. See, e.g., Redford, The Arguments For and Against the Commission Sys-
teM, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 124 (S. Krislov & L. Musolf eds. 1964).
179. See, e.g., J. TmHSTON, GOVERNmENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONs IN THE
ENGLISH SPEAKING CouNrIs 159 (1937).
180. See, e.g., Redford, supra note 178, at 123-24.
181. MINN. STAT. § 11A.08 subd. 6 (1980) (amended 1981) requires members
of the Investment Advisory Council to file an economic interest statement and
to refrain from participating in council deliberations and votes which "Will or
[are] likely to result in direct, measurable economic gain to the member." As
trustees, board members are subject to common law trust prohibitions against
self-dealing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959). Recent
amendments to OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3309.156 (Page Supp. 1981) adopt in-
vestment standards and prohibit certain transactions by board members.
182. The Ohio Attorney General has interpreted the state enabling legisla-
tion for transit authorities as prohibiting elected officials from serving as board
members. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 19, at 135. The prohibition
against elected officials serving as board members obviously should extend to
non-civil service employees of elected officials who, because of their positions,
are also more vulnerable to political pressures.
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by freeing the board from the government budget.183 Using
plan funds to pay for board expenses, rather than a legisla-
tively allocated portion of government revenues, reduces the
uncertainty regarding the board's financial ability to secure and
maintain necessary qualified staff, consultants, and investment
managers. It also reduces the possibility of legislative interfer-
ence in board activities through pressure on the board to adopt
a particular investment policy or to retain or dismiss a particu-
lar investment manager in exchange for budget approval.
If the board is to play a vital and active role as policymaker
and performance monitor, it is essential that board members
devote the time and energy that is necessary to perform board
responsibilities fully. Although the public recognition and
prestige involved in serving on a retirement board, the chal-
lenge of the work involved, and personal satisfaction derived
from fulfilling one's civic duty may help encourage qualified in-
dividuals to accept board membership and to discharge board
duties conscientiously, such factors are not sufficient alone. 84
To allow board members to devote adequate time to board ac-
tivities, the statute should provide for compensating board
members in an amount comparable to that paid directors of or-
ganizations engaged in similar activities.185 Statutory man-
dates that board members take part in periodic training
programs' 88 and attend a specified number of board and com-
183. See, e.g., J. THURSTON, supra note 179, at 256.
184. See supra note 160.
185. Neither Ohio nor Minnesota compensates board members beyond their
expenses. To avoid the need for repeated legislative amendments regarding
board compensation, the statute should empower the state auditor to deter-
mine an appropriate compensation level based on a survey conducted by the
auditor's office every three years. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note
19, at 117-18 for a discussion of the defects in a compensation arrangement
based on meetings attended. Note also that "the argument ... that compensat-
ing board members will lead to the appointment of unqualified candidates on
the basis of patronage ... is unsubstantiated, and there is evidence suggesting
the opposite." Id. at 117.
186. Such programs should not serve as remedial courses in investments,
finance, or community concerns since only individuals already possessing such
knowledge should qualify for board membership. N. HAmITON & P. HAmiLTON,
supra note 19, at 115-16. Rather, these programs should offer board members
training in the operations of public retirement systems and an awareness of the
current issues confronting the system. The need for such programs is apparent
in Minnesota where "there is no orientation program or any program that could
even remotely be regarded as training." OFFICE OF THE STATE AuDrroR, supra
note 105, at 4. In Ohio, SERS board members attend an in-house orientation
which is essentially an opportunity to meet each other and the staff. They also
attend a new trustees conference sponsored by the International Foundation of
Employee Benefit Plans for an introduction to such topics as the role of an ac-
tuary, the legal nature of a board member's status as a fiduciary, and determi-
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mittee meetings, noncompliance with which would be cause for
immediate removal from the board,187 would insure a minimal
time and attention commitment to board matters.
2. Board Structure
Because board members are not experts in the numerous
fields related to public retirement systems, they need a well in-
formed staff and outside consultants to help gather, analyze,
and use vast quantities of technical and general data essential
to policy formulation, fund evaluation, and management re-
view. The statute should direct the board to hire needed per-
sonnel and consultants. 88 The board should be provided with
an adequate budget or the authority to charge the pension fund
for reasonable expenses. 189
Board committees can also facilitate board performance. 9 o
Through the use of committees, a board member can specialize
in one of the areas of board responsibility. Specialization
broadens board experience and increases the thoroughness
and efficiency with which the board performs its planning, hir-
ing, monitoring, measuring and review functions.' 9 '
3. Board Accountability
Even if the measures suggested so far are incorporated into
a statutory scheme, they will not ensure that the board will ful-
fill its control objective, unless the legal structure also includes
provisions assuring board accountability. 92 Arguably, one
nation of a fund's investment return. Interview with Thomas R. Anderson,
supra note 69.
187. Under OHmO REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.06 (Page 1980), a board member is
deemed resigned if he or she misses board meetings for four months.
188. MIN. STAT. § 11A.04 (1980) provides that the SBI "shall ...
(4) [ejmploy investment advisors and consultants as it deems necessary."
Similarly, the SERS board "shall secure the service of such technical and ad-
ministrative employees as are necessary for the transaction of the business of
the ... system." Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3309.14 (Page 1980).
189. As discussed above, however, board independence is furthered by its
freedom from the government budget. See supra note 183 and accompanying
text.
190. Ohio's SERS board has separate committees responsible for disability
benefits, retirement benefits, and ad hoc personnel. The investment committee
is a committee of the whole. Interview with Thomas FL Anderson, supra note
69. This proposal envisions a further subdivision with respect to the board's in-
vestment responsibilities. See generally N. HAmiLTON & P. HAMILTON, supra
note 19, at 116-17.
191. The enabling statute should not specify the number or purpose of
board committees, but rather, should direct the board to establish the commit-
tee structure most appropriate to efficient functioning.
192. "[A]ccountability has to be sought in a far wider range of affairs: the
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method of assuring accountability is the direct election of
board members by state residents.193 Direct election avoids the
back-door political influence inevitable in a public appointment
process. In theory, it also results in better representation of
the general populace affected by board actions. Direct election
of officials responsible for administering public retirement pen-
sions, however, has several serious drawbacks. First, fewer
people are likely to vote in an election for retirement board
members than in national and statewide elections for executive
and legislative representatives. Second, voters are unlikely to
understand the nature of the board's responsibilities, the activi-
ties the board must engage in to fulfill its responsibilities, and
the qualifications of board members to perform board activities.
Third, the politics of the election process can lead board mem-
bers to overemphasize the taxpayers' unwillingness to pay
higher taxes and the social interests of various voter groups at
the expense of the financial retirement needs and desires of
plan participants and their beneficiaries in investment risk
level determinations. Pressure by various voter groups to use
retirement system funds to advance their social and economic
interests would lead to the pursuit of investment goals other
than the maximization of financial return to plan participants
within reasonable risk levels. It could also lead to board review
of management's individual investment decisions for their so-
cial "desirability," rather than for portfolio efficiency. Sensitiv-
ity to taxpayer and public employee concerns can be
encouraged through means other than the direct election of
board members, such as statutory restrictions on the number
of a member's successive terms,194 and gubernatorial appoint-
ment of board members nominated by a citizens' advisory com-
mittee and confirmed by the legislature.195
Media scrutiny of board affairs also contributes to board
sensitivity and accountability. Media reports of board actions,
of member qualifications, conflicts of interest, and attendance
at board meetings, and of the financial condition of the pension
fund can provide valuable information to taxpayers and public
management, performance, and results of public endeavor; the effectiveness, ef-
ficiency, economy, and productivity of public endeavor; and the honesty, integ-
rity, and fidelity demonstrated in the conduct of public endeavor." B.
FRIEDMAN, THE QUEST FOR AccouNTAB=rr 38 (1973).
193. For a review of the relative merits of an appointment process versus an
election process, see N. HAMILTON & P. HIAmILTON, spra note 19, at 121-23 and
the authorities cited therein.
194. See id. at 124.
195. See id. at 123.
[Vol. 67:211
1982] PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 257
employees. The statute, therefore, should mandate open board
and committee meetings, with appropriate executive session
exceptions, and require the disclosure of board resolutions,
minutes and studies to facilitate media coverage of the board's
performance.196
Another accountability measure the statute should require
is a periodic audit of the board and plan fund.197 Providing for
financial audits by a related government agency, such as the
state auditor's office, is inadequate for several reasons, how-
ever. First, the state auditor's office often lacks the budget,
staff, and expertise to deal thoroughly with the unique charac-
teristics of the public pension fund organization.198 Second,
since the state auditor is often represented on the retirement
board, an audit by a board member will not appear, and quite
possibly may not be, completely objective.199 Third, because
the state auditor is an elected official, there is potential for use
of the pension auditing process as a stage for politically moti-
vated actions and statements. 200 The pension statute should
require that a qualified external independent auditor perform
an annual audit. The audit should include a study of board
196. The United Nations Report discusses the problem of public enterprise
accountability and concludes:
The evaluation of the work of public industries remains a complex
matter of judgment, involving the balancing of many factors. The best
advice that can perhaps be given at the present time is to make sure
that those charged with responsibility for running each industry devise
as many measurements of work performance, unit costs, and so on, as
possible, and that the results produced are made public regularly and
as frequently as possible. In this way the legislature, the executive, the
press and the politically alert sections of the public will have the maxi-
mum amount of information on which to form judgments, and on which
to develop searching and health [sic] criticism of those in charge of the
enterprise.
United Nations Report, supra note 55, at 64. Similarly, Friedman states that
"[t]o be answerable is to generate and to supply information. To hold others
accountable requires that information be available as a basic foundation for
judgments." B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 192, at 2.
197. The Pension Task Force Report states:
The lack of an independent review of public pension plan financial
and actuarial matters carries an attendant risk of financial miscalcula-
tion or abuse. In regard to the need for independent review, public
pension plans cannot be viewed differently from other financial enter-
prises including the sponsoring governmental employers themselves.
PENsION TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 70.
198. Id.
199. This problem is eliminated in the proposal since, as an elected official,
the state auditor would not be .permitted to serve as a board member. See
supra note 182 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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structure and procedures as well as the accounting records of
the board and plan funds.
Judicial review offers a third means of holding the board
accountable. 201 Such review can take the form of a mandamus
or declaratory judgment action. Another form of judicial re-
view is the imposition of civil liability on board members
through tort law2 02 or the law of trusts. 2 03 The statutory
scheme should clearly authorize judicial review of board activi-
ties through such legal actions.2 04 To avoid any doubt, the stat-
ute should categorize board members as fiduciaries subject at
least to common law fiduciary duties and liabilities.
Those who are directly affected by board action should
have standing to institute appropriate legal action against the
board and its individual members. Clearly, the attorney gen-
eral should have standing on behalf of the state's taxpayers. In
addition, taxpayers should have standing in their own right.
Furthermore, the statutory scheme should grant contract or
property rights in plan funds to plan participants and benefi-
ciaries to provide them with a significant legal interest which
can serve as their basis for standing to invoke judicial review of
board performance. 2 05
201. For a discussion of the forms of judicial review and the limits of such
review due to governmental immunity, see N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra
note 19, at 125-28 and the authorities cited therein.
202. See, e.g., K. DAvIs, ADMmISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 26.01 (3d ed. 1972). See
generally Civil Liability of Government Officials, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(1978).
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-226 (1959). See generally
Note, Personal Liability of Directors of Federal Government Corporations, 30
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 733 (1980) (discussing appropriateness of analogy of per-
sonal liability of private corporate board members to members of governmental
boards with profit-maximizing goals).
204. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Subtitle B,
Part 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (1976). "The absence of a codified, substantive stan-
dard of conduct to which the fiduciary can be held frequently precludes recov-
ery by the plan or its aggrieved participants." PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 189.
205. The view persists that public employee pensions are gratuities. For ex-
ample, in Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retirement Bd., No.
768716 (Dist. Ct. Jan. 14, 1982), the state district court held that public pensions
are gratuities and thus denied relief to a retiree whose retirement checks were
cut off by a 1980 statutory amendment which retroactively increased the service
requirement for pension benefits. In Trustees of the Minn. Pub. Employees Re-
tirement Ass'n v. Minn. State Bd. of Inv., No. 452938 (Dist. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982), the
district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint which alleged negligence and
breach of fiduciary responsibilities by the defendants. The dismissal was based
in part on a finding that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring the action. The
plaintiffs included an active plan participant and a retired plan member, both
claiming property, beneficiary and contractual rights in the fund monies. De-
fendants argued with respect to these plaintiffs that they lacked standing to
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V. CONCLUSION
Public employee retirement systems were created to pro-
vide public employees with income for retirement. Most sys-
tems accumulate and invest funds to reduce the cost to
taxpayers of providing timely payments of promised benefits to
retirees. Thus, from the point of view of plan participants and
beneficiaries as well as taxpayers, public employee retirement
systems are financial ventures. Governmental control of public
retirement plans should seek the maximization of financial re-
turn on the investment of fund assets within a risk level which
is appropriate to the fulfillment of the financial purposes of the
pension system. In short, efficiency in the selection of an in-
vestment portfolio should be the sole objective of pension fund
regulation. The pursuit of other social goals, including the pro-
duction of nonfinancial benefits for retirees, through the regula-
tion of pension funds produces significant administrative
problems, the potential for arbitrary regulatory action and spe-
cial interest group dominance, and hidden subsidizations of
others by plan beneficiaries and taxpayers.
The legal, economic, organizational and procedural frame-
work in which governmental regulation operates should en-
courage and assist regulators in fulfilling their control
objective. Although a regulatory framework cannot absolutely
guarantee that the regulators in fact will fulfill this objective, it
can significantly impact the likelihood of success. At the heart
of the regulatory framework proposed in this Article is the
proposition that regulators should be charged with the respon-
sibility for creating and maintaining the conditions necessary
for the efficient management of plan funds. Thus, the retire-
ment board should be required to formulate and articulate in-
vestment policies sensitive to the legitimate interests of plan
beneficiaries and of taxpayers, who are ultimately the plan
sponsors. In order to obtain proper implementation of its poli-
cies, the board should 1) translate policies into operating objec-
tives capable of performance measurement; 2) select
competent external management; 3) impose competitive pres-
sue since public pensions are gratuities. Memorandum in Support of Defend-
ants' Motion to Dismiss at 11-13, Trustees of the Minn. Pub. Employees Retire-
ment Ass'n v. Minnesota State Bd. of Inv., No. 452938 (Dist. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
MnN. STAT. § 353.38 (1980) states that "[n]othing done under the terms of this
chapter... shall create or give any contract rights to any person .... ." See
Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARv. L REv.
992 (1977) for a review of the case law regarding the legal status of public em-
ployees' pension rights.
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sures on management; 4) communicate with management;
5) monitor and evaluate management's performance; and 6) im-
plement appropriate responses to management's performance.
This Article has also proposed statutory provisions to help en-
sure that board members will be competent, well motivated, in-
dependent, efficient and accountable. It should be noted that
many of these principles are relevant to the formulation and
implementation of policies relating to contributions and bene-
fits, as well as to investments.
Modification of existing public employee retirement sys-
tems in accordance with the proposed regulatory framework
would constitute a significant step toward meaningful and ef-
fective governmental regulation of public pension funds. This
step ultimately should achieve the purpose for which public
plans were first created-providing public employees with
defined financial retirement benefits at the least cost to
taxpayers.
